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SUMMARY 
Following the wave of corporate scandals that have surfaced over the past decade, 
significant attention has been showered on the efficiency of corporate governance 
practices, with particular scrutiny on the issue of director independence.  One 
specific category of directors frequently nominated to sit on corporate boards is the 
nominee director.  However, these directors often lack veritable independence 
given their extraneous loyalty towards their appointer, usually either a shareholder 
or stakeholder of the corporation.  Furthermore, while legal principle requires that 
all company directors exercise their statutory duties with a view to the best interests 
of the corporation, in practice nominee directors are expected to follow the 
instructions or wishes of their appointer, resulting in their inherent position of 
conflict. 
 
This text focuses on the nominee director and the conflict of interest resulting from 
such director’s position of dual loyalty.  Its objective is to provide a comprehensive 
examination of the various difficulties arising from, and associated with the 
appointment of nominee directors as well as the judicial and legislative responses 
to these difficulties.  In examining the various complications associated with 
nominee directors, the legal framework in several foreign jurisdictions, particularly 
the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand is also explored throughout this 
text to provide further insight and perspective on the different issues analysed 
herein. 
 
KEYWORDS: 
Nominee director, representative director, constituency director, appointment, 
independence, conflict of interest, dual loyalty.     
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RÉSUMÉ 
Dans la foulée des scandales financiers ayant secoué le milieu des affaires ces 
dernières années, l’efficacité des pratiques de régie d’entreprise, et, en particulier 
celles liées à l’indépendance des administrateurs, a été passée au crible.  
L’administrateur désigné par une partie pour la représenter est un type 
d’administrateur que l’on rencontre fréquemment au sein des conseils 
d’administration des entreprises.  Toutefois, l’on peut se questionner sur 
l’indépendance réelle de ces administrateurs, considérant leur loyauté envers la 
personne les ayant désignés, laquelle détient habituellement un intérêt à titre 
d’actionnaire ou de partie prenante dans l’entreprise visée.  En outre, alors que les 
principes légaux requièrent que les administrateurs agissent dans le meilleur intérêt 
de l’entreprise, la réalité pratique est parfois toute autre: aux prises avec les 
instructions ou les souhaits de la personne les ayant nommés, les administrateurs 
désignés se retrouvent placés en situation inhérente de conflit d’intérêts.   
 
Ce texte vise à offrir une analyse détaillée au sujet de l’administrateur désigné et du 
conflit d’intérêts résultant de cette double exigence de loyauté.  L’objectif est de 
présenter un examen approfondi des diverses difficultés résultant de la nomination 
d’un administrateur désigné ou associées à celle-ci, ainsi que des réponses 
judiciaires et législatives liées à cette problématique.  Cette réflexion mènera à une 
exploration de certains systèmes législatifs et légaux, en particulier ceux du 
Royaume-Uni, de l’Australie et de la Nouvelle-Zélande, afin d’obtenir une 
meilleure compréhension et d’offrir une perspective éclairée quant aux enjeux 
analysés par la présente.  
 
MOTS CLÉS : 
Administrateur désigné, désignation des administrateurs, devoir d’indépendance, 
conflit d’intérêts, double loyauté. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
There is no universal definition that can comprehensively recapitulate the concept of 
corporate governance.  Broadly defined, corporate governance may be described as being 
concerned with the “system by which companies are directed and controlled.”1 In light of 
the numerous corporate scandals that have surfaced in recent years2, significant attention 
has been showered on the efficiency of current corporate governance practices 
particularly in the U.S.3 However, despite discrepancies with the U.S. corporate culture; 
the efficiency of corporate governance practices has also been questioned in Canada4 and 
in other foreign jurisdictions.5  
At the summit of the “system by which companies are directed and controlled” sits the 
board of directors.6 Therefore, it comes as no surprise that scrutiny has been placed on 
the board7, making it a key target for corporate governance reforms. It has been 
contended that the conduct of the board was undoubtedly one of the pivotal factors 
resulting in the Enron crisis.8  As one commentator has suggested, the Enron saga is a 
powerful reminder that “good governance comes down to directors making good 
                                               
1
 U.K., Committee on the financial aspects of corporate governance, Report of the committee on the financial aspects of 
corporate governance (London: Gee, a division of Professional Publishing Ltd., 1992) at 14. 
2
 By way of example, the corporate scandals involving: (i) Enron, WorldCom, Adelphi and Global Crossings in the 
U.S.; (ii) Bre-X, Hollinger and Nourbourg in Canada; and (iii) HIH Insurance and OneTel in Australia. A more recent 
example is the “Madoff scandal” that has also created ripples far beyond the borders of the U.S. 
3
 Robert W. Hamilton, “The Crisis in Corporate Governance: 2002 Style” (2003) 40 Houston L. Rev. 1 at 35 (HEIN); 
Robert Wright, “Enron: The Ambitious and the Greedy” (2003) 16 Windsor Rev. Legal Soc. Issues 71 at 3 (QL) 
[Wright]; Cheryl L. Wade, “The Interplay between Securities Regulation and Corporate Governance: Shareholder 
Activism, the Shareholder Proposal Rule, and Corporate Compliance with Law” in Janis Sarra, ed., Corporate 
Governance in Global Markets (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003) 156 at 157. 
4
 Sukanya Pillay, “Forcing Canada’s Hand? The Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Canadian Corporate Governance 
Reform” (2004) 30 Man. L.J. 285 (QL); Janis Sarra, “The Corporation as Symphony: Are Shareholders First Violin or 
Second Fiddle?” (2003) 36 U.B.C.L. Rev. 403 (QL). 
5
 Oliver Krackhardt, “New Rules for Corporate Governance in the United States and Germany – A model for New 
Zealand?” (2005) 36 V.U.W.L.R. 319 (QL); Jennifer Hill, Regulatory Responses to Global Corporate Scandals (Legal 
Studies Research Paper No. 06/35) (Sydney: Sydney Law School, 2005), online: SSRN 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=886104>.  
6
 Carol Hansell, What Directors Need to Know: Corporate Governance (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2003) at 2 
[Hansell, Corporate Governance]. 
7
 William W. Bratton, “Enron and the dark side of shareholder value” (2002) 76 Tul. L. Rev. 1275 (HEIN) [Bratton]; 
Wright, supra note 3.  
8
 Bratton, ibid at 1287. 
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decisions”.9 Moreover, comprehensive research has suggested that independent boards 
may contribute to improved corporate decision-making.10  
Director independence has become an integral aspect of corporate governance reform, 
particularly following the emergence of the aforementioned corporate scandals.11 An 
independent director has been defined by the (Canadian) Joint Committee on Corporate 
Governance12 as “an outside and unrelated director who is also not affiliated with the 
significant shareholder”.13 A director is necessarily disqualified from being independent 
when social, professional or financial ties between the director, and the company or, a 
significant interest, may influence the director’s conduct.14 Perhaps, an explanation for 
the focus on director independence may stem from the fact that most of the corporations 
absorbed in the wave of corporate scandals lacked truly independent directors.15  
One specific category of directors frequently nominated or appointed to sit on corporate 
boards are commonly referred to as either nominee, representative or constituency 
directors.  While these directors may sometimes qualify as independent, based on the 
literal definitions of “independence” as set forth in various corporate governance 
guidelines, they are necessarily disqualified from ever being considered truly 
                                               
9
 Michael Useem, “Corporate Governance is Directors Making Decisions: Reforming the Outward Foundations for 
Inside Decision Making” (2003) 7:3 Journal of Management and Governance 241 at 249.   
10
 Stéphane Rousseau, “La gouvernance d’entreprise à la croisée des chemins: comment restaurer la confiance des 
investisseurs à la suite de l’affaire Enron?” in Service de la formation permanente du Barreau du Québec : 
Développements récents en droit des affaires (Cowansville: Yvon Blais, 2003) at para. 2.2.2. (REJB); Canada, Beyond 
Compliance: Building a Governance Culture (Final Report) (Ottawa: Joint Committee on Corporate Governance, 
November 2001) at 13, online: Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants 
<http://www.cica.ca/multimedia/Download_Library/Research_Guidance/Risk_Management_Governance/Governance_
Eng_Nov26.pdf> [Joint Committee on Corporate Governance]. However, compare D.M. Nachane, Saibal Ghosh & 
Partha Ray, “Bank nominee directors and corporate performance: micro evidence for India” (19 March 2005) 
Economic and Political Weekly 1216 at 1217, online: Munich Personal RePEc Archive (Munich University Library) 
<http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1714/> [Nachane, Ghosh & Ray].  
11
 Hansell, Corporate Governance, supra note 6 at 77; John F. Olsen & Michael T. Adams, “Composing a Balanced 
and Effective Board to Meet New Governance Mandates” (2004) 59:2 Bus. Law. 421 (QL); Cary Coglianese & 
Michael L. Michael, After the Scandals: Changing Relationships in Corporate Governance (Regulatory Policy 
Program Report RPP-09, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2006) at 19, online: SSRN 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=911653 >. 
12
 The Joint Committee on Corporate Governance was mandated by the Toronto Stock Exchange and the Canadian 
Institute of Chartered Accounts to review the state of corporate governance practices in Canada and recommend 
changes to Canadian corporate governance standards. 
13
 Joint Committee on Corporate Governance, supra note 10 at 17. 
14
 Hansell, Corporate Governance, supra note 6 at 76. 
15
 Rachel A. Fink, “Social Ties in the Boardroom: Changing the Definition of Director Independence to Eliminate 
‘Rubber Stamping’ Boards” (2005-2006) 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 455 at 456 (HEIN). 
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independent.16 This is predominantly due to the nominee director’s relationship with the 
person or entity who appointed him.17   
This thesis is centered on nominee directorship and the particularities that result from 
their lack of independence and conflict of interest.  Specifically, its objective is to provide 
a comprehensive examination of the difficulties arising from, and associated with, the 
position of nominee directors as well as the judicial and legislative responses to these 
difficulties.  The legal framework in connection with nominee directorship in several 
foreign jurisdictions, particularly the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand have 
also been researched, to provide further insight and perspective on the different issues in 
connection with nominee directors.  To this author’s knowledge, elaboration on the 
particularities of nominee directors and the different matters relating thereto, have not 
been the subject of any comprehensive scholarly research or doctrinal commentary within 
the Canadian context.  
The bulk of the research and analysis contained herein is rooted in the common law, 
perhaps because the subject matter is so intrinsically related to the fiduciary duty owed by 
directors to the corporation, which originates from the common law.18  However, it is 
important to note that although the C.C.Q. and civil law generally is of primordial 
importance and application in the province of Québec, many of the rules contained in the 
C.C.Q. were inspired and influenced by the common law.19 Furthermore, it is evident that 
Québec courts are not reticent towards the use of the common law as a viable instrument 
in interpreting and evolving the law in Québec,20 particularly as regards corporate 
governance.  By way of example, in the recent decision of Gravino v. Enerchem 
Transport Inc., the Québec Court of Appeal undertook an elaborate analysis of various 
                                               
16
 Austl., Commonwealth, Companies and Securities Law Review Committee, The Duties and Liabilities of Nominee 
Directors and Alternate Directors (Discussion Paper - No. 7) Chaired by Professor Harold A.J. Ford (Sydney: 
Australian Government Takeovers Panel, 1987) at para. 103ff, online: Australian Government Takeovers Panel < 
http://www.takeovers.gov.au/content/Resources/cslrc/cslrc_discussion_paper_no_7.aspx> [Discussion Paper No. 7, 
1987]. 
17
 Ibid. 
18
 BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders, 2008 SCC 69 at para. 37 (CANLII) [BCE 1976]. 
19
 Robert Leckey, “Harmoniser le droit dans un espace multilingue et pluri-juridique : un point de vue canadien” (2008) 
Rev. D. U. 39 at 41-42.  
20
 Department of Justice Canada, “Some Thoughts on Bijuralism in Canada and the World” in The Harmonization of 
Federal Legislation with the Civil Law of the Province of Québec and Canadian Bijuralism (Booklet 2) by Marie-
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influential common law decisions in determining whether the subject directors had 
breached their fiduciary duties owed to the company.21 As such, despite an emphasis on 
doctrine and case law emanating from the common law, most of the analysis contained 
herein applies to both common and civil law jurisdictions.  
Prior to commencing this analysis, a brief description of the chapters to follow is 
provided.  Firstly, the remainder of this introductory chapter shall formally introduce and 
define the notion of nominee directors, identify their most common appointers as well as 
the objective of their appointment.  It shall also introduce the inherent conflict relating to 
nominee directorship as well as the practical issues resulting therefrom.  The second 
chapter is divided between: (i) a description of the Canadian economic landscape that 
may contribute to increased nominee directorship; and (ii) an overview of the most 
significant directors’ duties as well as the conduct that is lawfully expected from all 
directors, with no exception as regards nominee directors.  This will naturally lead to an 
illustration of the tension between nominee directors’ statutory duties owed to the 
company and what is expected from them in commercial practice.  The third chapter 
turns to an examination of the contrasting judicial trends fashioned in response to the 
conflict-riddled position of nominee directors with a view to the reconciliation of these 
trends.  The fourth chapter describes the most common difficulties associated with 
nominee directorship and also examines the different judicial and legislative responses 
formulated to address these difficulties.  The concluding chapter will provide an 
overview of the different proposals in connection with the adoption of legislation to 
regulate the position of nominee directors, as well as the legislative commentary in 
connection with same, followed with this author’s final conclusions on the subject.   
1.1 Defining nominee directors 
A nominee director may be defined as a person appointed to a corporate board of 
directors with an underlying understanding that he will represent the particular interests 
                                                                                                                                            
Claude Gervais & Marie-France Séguin (Ottawa : Department of Justice Canada, 24 June 2003) at 2, online: 
Department of Justice Canada < http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/dept-min/pub/hfl-hlf/b2-f2/bf2a.html#general>.  
21
 Gravino v. Enerchem Transport Inc, 2008 QCCA 1820 at para. 39ff (CANLII) [Gravino v. Enerchem].  
5 
 
of a person or group of persons, most often the interests of his appointer.22 As such, 
nominee directorship is frequently characterized by an “extraneous loyalty” towards an 
outside interest.23 While a separate law for nominee directors does not exist per se24, legal 
recognition of nominee directorship is evident in various legislative sources.  In Canada, 
such recognition may be evidenced by way of Section 124 of the Canada Business 
Corporations Act25 (the “CBCA”).  Section 124 deals with the indemnification of a 
director or officer who has acted in the best interests of “another entity” at the request of 
the corporation.  Thus, Section 124 permits the indemnification of directors appointed by 
one corporation to sit on the board of another corporation.  Therefore under this 
provision, it would appear that a nominee director appointed, at the request of the parent 
company, to sit on the board of a subsidiary, or an affiliate company, is entitled to 
director indemnification.26  
Implicit reference to nominee directorship is also evident in the legislation of the 
different jurisdictions researched.  A provision in the (Australian) Corporations Act 
200127 states that the resolution for the removal of a director “appointed to represent the 
interests of particular shareholders” shall not take effect until a replacement has been 
appointed to represent said shareholders.  It has been put forth that this provision 
evidences recognition of the practice of appointing nominees onto corporate boards.28  A 
more explicit recognition of nominee directorship may be found in the (Australian) 
Duties Act 200029, a provision which grants an exemption from duties payable in 
circumstances where the transfer of marketable securities was effected “for the sole 
purpose of qualifying the transferee as nominee director to act and vote on behalf of the 
                                               
22
 Paul Redmond, “Nominee Directors” (1987) 10 U.N.S.W.L.J. 194 at 194 [Redmond].  
23
 Harold Arthur John Ford, Robert P. Austin & Ian M. Ramsay, Ford’s principles of Corporations Law, 11th ed., 
(Sydney, Australia: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2003) at para. 9.420 [Ford et al.].  
24
 Ibid. 
25
 Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44 [CBCA].  
26
 Canada, Canada Business Corporations Act Discussion Paper on Directors’ Liability (Ottawa: Industry Canada, 
November 1995) at 32, online: Government of Canada < http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection/C2-280-7-1995E.pdf> 
[Canada Business Corporations Act, Discussion Paper]. However, the appointing corporation must have a financial 
interest in the company on whose board it is appointing a director.  
27
 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth.), Section 203(d) [Corporations Act]. 
28
 Austl., Commonwealth, Company Securities and Advisory Committee, Corporate Groups (Final Report) (Sydney: 
Company Securities and Advisory Committee, 2000) at 68, online: Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee < 
http://www.camac.gov.au/camac/camac.nsf/byHeadline/PDFFinal+Reports+2000/$file/Corporate_Groups,May_2000.p
df> [Corporate Groups (Final Report)]. 
29
 Duties Act 2000, Act. No. 79/2000, subsection 66(2)(b).  
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holding company it directs.” More explicit references to the appointment of nominee 
directors are found in various other company law statutes, particularly in those of New 
Zealand which shall be highlighted in the fourth and fifth chapters. 
In light of the foregoing, both implicit and explicit recognition of nominee directorship 
by way of legislation is another indication that the practice of appointing such directors is 
not illegitimate; rather it is the inherent conflict faced by these directors that poses the 
problem.30  
1.2 Identifying appointers  
Appointers of nominee directors are often holders of a significant share interest in the 
company, whether an individual, a group of shareholders or even an entity.31 The 
appointer may also be an institutional investor, a joint venture partner, or a group of 
employees.32 Even creditors may request board representation as comfort that their 
specific interests are being protected.33 Hence, the appointer is generally any person, or 
group of persons, legal or moral, with an identifiable interest in the corporation.  
Interestingly, various doctrinal commentators have voiced their support for the 
imposition of liability on appointers for the wrongful conduct of their nominees.  
Doctrinal commentary has put forth various grounds upon which an appointer may be 
held liable.34 The question of whether an appointer can be held liable for the conduct of 
its nominee has also been opined in situations where a parent company appoints a 
nominee onto the board of its subsidiary.  In addition to doctrinal commentary, the 
possibility of appointer liability has also surfaced in case law.  However, for the most 
part, the law on this issue remains uncertain.  Appointer liability will be elaborated upon 
in the fourth chapter hereof.  
                                               
30
 Redmond, supra note 22 at 197. 
31
 John De Lacy, “The concept of a company director: Time for a new expanded and unified statutory concept” (2006) 
J. Bus. L. 267 at 284 [De Lacy]. 
32
 Redmond, supra note 22 at 195; E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. DiGuglielmo, “How Many Masters Can a 
Director Serve? A Look at the Tensions Facing Constituency Directors” (2007-2008) 63 Bus. Law. 761 (HEIN) 
[Veasey & DiGuglielmo].  
33
 Ford et al., supra note 23 at para. 9.420.  
34
 Robert P. Austin, Harold Arthur John Ford & Ian M., Ramsay, Company Directors: Principles of Law & Corporate 
Governance (Sydney: LexisNexis, 2005) at para. 14.35 [Austin et al., Company Directors].  
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1.3 Motives for appointment  
Nominee directors are often appointed on an informal basis, on the mere understanding 
that they will act in favour of their appointer.  However, appointment may also result 
from rights stipulated in the corporation’s articles, a joint venture agreement or even a 
shareholders’ agreement.  Moreover, financing agreements often contain, as a condition 
precedent to advancing the necessary funds, the lender’s right to nominate one or several 
board members.  
As such, the motives for appointment may vary.  In the case of a majority, or controlling 
shareholder, the primary motive for the appointment is often to ensure representation and 
protection of such shareholder’s particular interests.  In the case of an institutional 
investor, a nominee director shall likely be expected to ensure the adequate protection of 
the investment.  
However, it is important to note that there are many associated incentives with the 
appointment of nominee directors.  By way of example, their appointment may provide 
effective solutions to various difficulties that are often faced by corporations, such as 
ensuring harmonious operation of group companies, protection of strategic interests such 
as those of institutional investors who agree to lend funds on condition that they are 
granted board representation, and finally to fill in for shareholders who do not necessarily 
possess the adequate expertise to personally serve as directors.35 As such, a nominee 
director should not necessarily be viewed as a negative force on the corporate board.  To 
the contrary, often times the nominee director may be the foreign member on the board, 
who provides the fresh perspective or the innovative insight with respect to the 
business.36  However, despite the positive impact that a nominee director may provide, it 
is difficult to ignore the conflict of interest faced by individuals in these positions. 
                                               
35
 De Lacy, supra note 31 at 284-285. 
36
 Stéphane Rousseau & Bastien Gauthier, “Le devoir de loyauté de l’administrateur désigné par un investisseur 
institutionnel” in Service de la formation continue du Barreau du Québec : Développements Récents en litige 
commercial, (Cowansville: Yvon Blais, 2007) 33 at 6-7 (REJB) [Rousseau & Gauthier].  
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1.4 The principal impediment: dual loyalty 
“The director who is a nominee of a substantial shareholder is 
between the devil and the deep blue sea. Happily perhaps for his 
peace of mind he is most often unaware of the company law principles. 
No doubt he will only remain a director while he furthers the wishes of 
the shareholder by whom he was appointed.”37  
The aforementioned passage, authored by Professor Ross Parsons, has been repeatedly 
cited by doctrinal commentators that have undertaken an analysis of the principal 
predicament faced by nominee directors: the position of dual loyalty.38  The problem lies 
in that the very nature of nominee directorship is prima facie incompatible with a board 
of director’s fiduciary duty to the company.  As Professor Redmond notes:  
“Is not the duty of loyalty to the general shareholder interests 
compromised where a nominee director is appointed for the very 
purpose of acting partially, whether by subordinating the 
interests of the general body of members to those of the appointer 
or by identifying company interests with those of the 
appointer?”39 
Thus, several important questions arise with respect to the position of nominee directors, 
primarily, how to reconcile the legal principle dictating the nominee director’s duties 
towards the company, with the commercial reality of how his appointer shall expect him 
to govern.  In a report commissioned by the federal government of Canada, authors and 
attorneys, Nicholl and Paskell-Mede eloquently state: 
“From a practical viewpoint, shareholders and creditors appoint their 
nominees to the board of directors precisely because they want their 
special interests to be looked after. On the other hand, once appointed, 
if the nominee director is to look to the best interests of the 
corporation, even when those interests differ from those of the 
appointing shareholder or creditor, he or she is almost certainly going 
to disappoint his appointer”.40  
                                               
37
 Ross W. Parsons, “The Directors’ Duty of Good Faith” (1967) 5 Melbourne U. L. Rev. 395 at 418 [Parsons]. 
38
 See e.g. Pey-Woan Lee, “Serving two masters – The dual loyalties of the nominee director in corporate groups” 
(2003) J. Bus. Law 449 at 450 (WEST) [Lee].  
39
 Redmond, supra note 22 at 197. 
40
 Mindy Paskell-Mede & John Nicholl, “Directors’ Liability from Private Rights of Action” (Final Report presented to 
Industry Canada, Ottawa) (25 May 1994) at 74 [unpublished] [Paskell-Mede, Directors’ Liability].  
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Hence, where the nominee director does not govern with a faithful commitment to his 
appointer’s interest, the director’s appointment shall most likely be brief.  However, 
where the director ignores his obligations towards the company, he shall be in breach of 
his directors’ duties and more importantly face the liability that may flow from such 
breach.  This tension between legal principle and commercial reality gives rise to the 
central difficulty faced by nominee directors, being the extent to which a nominee may 
give consideration to the interests of his appointer in governing the corporation and 
exercising his discretion.  Evidently, in situations where the nominee acts as a puppet in 
the hands of his appointer, oblivious of his fiduciary duties, the nominee shall clearly be 
in breach.41 However, in most situations, the extent of the nominee director’s allegiance 
to his appointer is unclear.  
1.5 Common difficulties 
Most of the legal literature, particularly in Australia, involving nominee directorship, 
debates the impediment of dual loyalty and contemplates the different judicial 
approaches, so as to propose a proper formulation of the nominee director’s duties.  
However, a myriad of other difficulties associated with nominee directorship also exist 
and have given rise to litigation.  By way of example, one frequent issue is the nominee 
director’s access to confidential corporate information and the possibility of reporting 
such information back to his appointer.  In fact, it is often expected of the nominee to 
report back corporate information regarding matters of importance to the appointer.42 
Additional difficulties involve the appointment of nominee directors to boards in the 
corporate group or joint venture context, and whether they may act in the interests of their 
appointer, who is most often the parent or the joint venture partner.  Prior to examining 
the different judicial approaches, the common difficulties and the legislative endeavours 
associated with nominee directorship, it is important to begin with an understanding of 
the economic and legal landscape in which nominee directorship arises.   
                                               
41
 Selangor United Rubber Estates Ltd. v. Cradock and Others (No. 3.), (1968) 1 W.L.R. 1555 (QL) [Selangor v. 
Cradock].  
42
 Leigh Thomson, “Nominee and multiple directors and confidential information” in John H. Farrar, ed., 
Contemporary Issues in Company Law (Auckland: Commerce Clearing House (New Zealand), 1987) 161 at 162 
[Thomson].   
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2. THE ECONOMIC AND LEGAL LANDSCAPE 
As noted in the introduction, this second chapter’s objective is to provide an overview of 
the relevant economic and legal aspects of the Canadian corporate environment in which 
nominee directorship arises.  The first part of this chapter presents certain characteristic 
of the economic landscape, particularly corporate ownership and structural patterns, that 
likely contribute to both the prevalence of nominee directorship and the difficulties 
associated therewith.  The second part of this chapter contains a selective overview of 
particular duties that are in conflict with the position of a nominee director.  
2.1 The economic landscape 
2.1.1 Concentrated corporate ownership 
Economic research illustrates that the diffused ownership structure characteristic of the 
American corporate model, as suggested back in 1932 by professors Berle and Means is 
not descriptive of the Canadian corporate environment.43 Although it appears that the 
“widely held firm” was preponderant in the middle of the twentieth century; the last thirty 
to forty years have resulted in a reappearance of concentrated corporate ownership.44 In 
fact, with the exception of the U.S. and the U.K., the majority of other countries are 
equally characterized by a concentration of corporate ownership.45 Dispersed ownership 
characteristic of U.S. and U.K. corporations may be attributable to the size of the 
                                               
43
 Yoser Gadhoum, “Power of Ultimate Controlling Owners: A Survey of the Canadian Landscape” (2006) 10 Journal 
of Management Governance 79 at 180-181 [Gadhoum]; Ronald Daniels & Paul Halpern, “Too Close for Comfort: The 
Role of the Closely Held Public Corporation in the Canadian Economy and the Implications for Public Policy” (1995) 
26 Can. Bus. L.J. 11 at 12 (HEIN) [Daniels & Halpern]. 
44
 Randall Morck, Michael Percy, Gloria Tian & Bernard Yeung, “The Rise and Fall of the Widely Held Firm” in 
Randall Morck, ed., A History of Corporate Governance Around the World, by the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005) 65 at 66. Interestingly, see also Calin Valsan, “2007: A 
Canadian Corporate Ownership Survey” (Working Paper Series) (Lennoxville: Williams School of Business – Bishop’s 
University, 2008) at 14ff,  online: SSRN <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1158544>. Valsan 
provides recent empirical evidence illustrating a decrease in concentrated corporate ownership over the past ten years, 
particularly in Western Canada. 
45
 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, “Corporate Ownership Around the World” (1999) 
LIV:2 Journal of finance 471 at 471-472; Aviv Pichhadze, “Mergers, Acquisitions, and Controlling Shareholders: 
Canada and Germany Compared” (2003) 18 B.F.L.R. 341 at 343-346; Randall Morck, Gloria Tian and Bernard Yeung, 
“Who owns whom? Economic nationalism and family controlled pyramidal groups in Canada” in Lorraine Eden & 
Wendy Dobson, eds., Governance, Multinational and Growth (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2005) 
44 at 44. 
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corporations in these countries that tend to be much larger than corporations in countries 
such as Canada.46  
In Canada, a 2006 report indicated that over half of the country’s largest corporations 
have controlling shareholders, ranging from families, affiliated corporations to large 
financial institutions.47 Economic studies have provided considerable empirical evidence 
in support of the foregoing; for example, one particular study revealed that families 
control 56.17% of Canadian corporations.48 Furthermore, in approximately 70% of these 
family-controlled companies, the controlling shareholder generally appoints members of 
his or her family into executive positions.49   
Given that there is no obligation to register the appointment of nominees, there is no 
effective method of monitoring the prevalence of nominee directorship in Canada.  
Nonetheless, it is quite rational to infer a positive correlation between concentrated 
corporate ownership and nominee directorship.50  Furthermore, Australia, a jurisdiction in 
which a considerable amount of legal literature in connection with nominee directorship 
has been published, is also characterized by a corporate environment with condensed 
ownership.51 As Hansell notes, “it is common practice for persons who have significant 
interest in the corporation to nominate certain individuals to act as directors.”52 In other 
words, it is a logical inference that a controlling shareholder of a firm, whether an 
individual or a family, shall likely appoint directors to the board with a view to ensuring 
that such shareholder’s wishes are respected. 
                                               
46
 Gadhoum, supra note 43 at 200; Canada, Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada, Some Obstacles 
to Good Corporate Governance in Canada and How to Overcome Them (Final Report) by Randall Morck & Bernard 
Yeung (Ottawa: Canada Steps Up, 2006) 281 at 311, online: Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada 
<http://www.tfmsl.ca/docs/V4(5)%20Morck.pdf> [Morck & Yeung].  
47
 Morck & Yeung, ibid at 293. 
48
 Gadhoum, supra note 43 at 180. 
49
 Ibid. 
50
 Accord Robert P. Austin & Minter Ellison, “Representatives and Fiduciary Responsibilities – Notes on Nominee 
Directorships and Life Arrangements” (1995) 7 Bond L. R. 19 at 24 [Austin & Ellison].   
51
 Ian M. Ramsay & Mark Blair, “Ownership Concentration, Institutional Investment and Corporation Governance: An 
Empirical Investigation of 100 Australian Companies” (1993-1994) 19 Melbourne U. L. Rev. 153 at 165-169; Alan 
Dignam & Michael Galanis, “Australia Inside-Out: The Corporate Governance System of the Australian Listed 
Market” (2004) 28 Melbourne U. L.R. 623 at 628-629 (QL). 
52
 Hansell, Corporate Governance, supra note 6 at 111. 
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High concentrated ownership has been arguably linked with increased firm 
performance.53 By way of example, a controlling shareholder is arguably beneficial for 
the corporation in circumstances where such shareholder is decidedly sophisticated, 
business oriented and ethical.54 Moreover, where a shareholder is actively involved in the 
business, management will be under such shareholder’s direct supervision and 
misconduct will likely be detected.55 A controlling shareholder’s presence may equally 
provide comfort for smaller investors.56 Hence, one of the most popular arguments in 
favour of concentrated ownership in the hands of a controlling shareholder is the 
promotion of a more proficient administration in view of the controlling shareholder’s 
personal economic investment in the corporation.57  
Conversely however, equity control often translates into a shareholder’s increased control 
over the board.58 As such, it contributes to the difficulties, and more precisely, the 
conflict of interest, associated with nominee directorship.  As Daniels and Waitzer note:  
“Knowing full well that controlling shareholders can vote a stubborn 
board out of office at the next annual meeting, directors will faithfully 
implement the controlling shareholders’ desires.”59  
Hence, in commercial practice, a nominee director cannot defy the wishes of his 
appointer who is often the controlling shareholder, particularly in circumstances where 
the latter will terminate the former if he disobeys his appointer’s instructions.  One may 
once again refer to Parsons’ passage, cited in the introductory chapter so as reiterate this 
predicament: “no doubt [the nominee] will only remain a director while he furthers the 
wishes of the shareholder by whom he was appointed.”60    
                                               
53
 Morck & Yeung, supra note 46 at 295.  
54
 Ibid.  
55
 Ibid.; Ronald J. Daniels & Edward J. Waitzer, “Challenges to the Citadel: A brief Overview of Recent Trends in 
Canadian Corporate Governance” (1994) 23 Can. Bus. L.J. 23 at 26 [Daniels & Waitzer].   
56
 Morck & Yeung, supra note 46 at 295.  
57
 Ibid.  
58
 Ronald J. Daniels & Edward M. Iacobucci “Some Causes and Consequences of Corporate Ownership Concentration 
in Canada” in Randall Morck, ed., Concentrated Corporate Ownership, by the National Bureau of Economic Research 
(Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2000) 81 at 83-84; Daniels & Halpern, supra note 43 at 16. 
59
 Daniels & Waitzer, supra note 55 at 26. 
60
 Parsons, supra note 37. 
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In consequence of the foregoing, jurisdictions such as Canada, characterized by 
condensed corporate ownership likely also contain a prevalence of nominee directors.  
Furthermore, concentrated ownership, often in the hands of one controlling shareholder, 
contributes to the conflict of interest faced by the nominee director appointed by such 
shareholder.  
2.1.2 The rise of institutional investors 
Institutional investors may be categorized as financial institutions that invest savings of 
individuals and non-financial entities into the financial markets.61 In Canada, institutional 
investors comprise banks, caisses populaires, mutual funds, life insurance companies as 
well as public and private sector pension plans.62  
Interestingly, institutional investors have considerably increased their investments over 
the last quarter of a century; in fact, by 1998, pension and mutual funds owned almost 
50% of the shares in publicly traded Canadian corporations.63 Moreover, this trend is not 
exclusive to Canada; a remarkable increase in institutional shareholdings is also evident 
in OECD jurisdictions world-wide.64 There have been various explanations for this 
exponential growth, such as the aging population who have become increasingly 
concerned with insurance and savings.65     
Concurrently with their extraordinary growth, institutional investors have become 
progressively more involved in the corporate affairs of the companies into which they 
have invested funds.66 To a certain extent, support for greater institutional investor 
activism has been reflected in legal literature; however there does not appear to be a 
                                               
61
 Hans J. Blommestein & Norbert Funke, Institutional Investors in the New Financial Landscape, (Paris: OECD 
Publications, 1997) at 69.  
62
 Canada, The Governance Practices of Institutional Investors (Ottawa: Report of the Senate Committee on Banking, 
Trade and Commerce, 1998) (Chair: Hon. Michael Kirby), online: Parliament of Canada <http://www.parl.gc.ca/36/ 
1/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/bank-e/rep-e/rep16nov98-e.htm#TABLE%20OF%20CON TENTS>. 
63
 Ibid.; Jeffrey G. MacIntosh “Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance in Canada” (1996) 26 Can. L.J. 
145 at 145 [MacIntosh].  
64
 E. Philip Davis, “Institutional investors, corporate governance and the performance of the corporate sector” (2002) 
26 Economic Systems 203 at 204. 
65
 MacIntosh, supra note 63 at 150.  
66
 Ibid.  
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consensus on the precise degree and manner in which such activism should be 
exercised.67    
Institutional investor activism has materialized into several different methods, including 
the institutional investor’s request for board representation.68 It has been contended that 
certain institutional investors do not favour this latter method of activism in view of the 
potential conflict of interest faced by the nominee director as well as other factors such as 
the onerous and time-consuming commitment, legislative constraints and liability that are 
linked with the position of a board director.69 Furthermore, often times, the nominee 
director of the institutional investor may not possess sufficient industry knowledge as 
well as the necessary expertise to sit on the board.70   
However, notwithstanding the foregoing aversions, for many institutional investors, 
board representation has become routine, particularly in circumstances where they have 
invested substantial funds.71 Furthermore, it has been put forth that nominee directors 
appointed by financial institutions could in fact contribute to enhanced corporate 
governance in view of such directors’ expert knowledge of the financial system.72  
In light of the foregoing, the rise of institutional investors in many jurisdictions world-
wide and particularly in Canada has resulted in increased institutional investor activism. 
Given that requesting board representation is a form of such activism, one can infer that 
this also contributes to an increase in nominee directors.  Despite the positive role that a 
nominee director of an institutional investor may play, the risk of conflict is high.  In fact, 
it is difficult to ignore the conflict of interest faced by nominees of institutional investors, 
                                               
67
 Jennifer Hill, Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance in Australia (Legal Studies Research Paper No. 
08/37) (Sydney: Sydney Law School, 2008). 
68
 Kathryn E. Montgomery “Market Shift – The role of Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance” (1996) 26 
Can. Bus. L.J. 189 at 195.  
69
 Ibid.  
70
 Ibid. Although according to Rousseau & Gauthier, supra note 36 at 8, at least one study appears to conclude that in 
Canada, officers of institutional investors who are appointed as nominee directors make a valuable contribution to the 
company they have been appointed to govern. See also John Erickson, Yan W. Park & Hyun-Han Shin “Board 
composition and firm value under concentrated ownership: the Canadian evidence” (2005) 13 Pacific-Basin Finance 
Journal 387 at 401. 
71
 Rousseau & Gauthier, supra note 36 at 3. 
72
 Nachane, Ghosh & Ray, supra note 10 at 1217. See also Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan “Bankers on 
boards: monitoring conflicts of interests and lender liability” (2001) 62 Journal of Financial Economics 415.  
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particularly in circumstances where the nominee is already director or officer of the 
institutional investor, as may be the case.73  
2.1.3 Corporate structural patterns 
Another imperative characteristic of the Canadian corporate landscape and also the result 
of corporate concentration74 is the prevailing corporate structural pattern, namely the 
corporate or business groups, also referred to as the group enterprise.75 Corporate groups 
differ significantly from the classic model of the corporation as a single independent 
entity. Rather, a corporate group is often comprised of a network of intertwined 
companies; related by common ownership and control, often in the hands of a parent or 
holding company that sits at the summit of the corporate pyramid.76 Moreover, corporate 
groups in Canada generally differ from those in the U.S. or the U.K.77 In these latter 
jurisdictions, the corporate group shall likely consist of a single listed firm with several 
wholly-owned subsidiaries.78 However, this is not the case in Canada where a corporate 
group is usually comprised of numerous separately listed firms, often controlled 
indirectly, by a sole shareholder, usually a family.79 Hence, as Blumberg notes “in the 
modern economy, business of large or moderate size, is typically conducted not by a 
single corporation but by a group of affiliated companies under the “control” of a parent 
corporation”.80 This structure often creates a “pyramid-like” configuration, a situation 
that is also illustrative in Australia, even among smaller privately-held entities.81 Smaller 
                                               
73
 Rousseau & Gauthier, supra note 36 at 5.  
74
 Neil C. Sargent, “Corporate Groups and the Corporate Veil in Canada: A Penetrating Look at Parent-Subsidiary 
Relations in the Modern Corporate Enterprise” (1988) 17 Man. L.J. 156 at 160 [Sargent].  
75
 Morck & Yeung, supra note 46 at 299.   
75
 Ibid. 
76
 Sargent, supra note 74 at 158. 
77
 The corporate group structure is also apparent in these jurisdictions, particularly in the U.K, see e.g. Daniel D. 
Prentice “Some Aspects of the Law relating to Corporate Groups in the United Kingdom” (1998) 13 Conn. J. Int’l L. 
205 at 314 (HEIN) [Prentice]; Julian Franks, Colin Mayer & Stefano Rossi, “Spending less time with the family – The 
decline of family ownership in the United Kingdom” in Randall Morck, ed.,  A History of Corporate Governance 
Around the World, by the National Bureau of Economic Research (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005) 581. 
78
 Morck & Yeung, supra note 46 at 296.  
79
 Ibid.; Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung “Agency Problems in Large Family Business Groups” (2003) 27:4 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 367 at 372-375.  
80
 Phillipe I. Blumberg, “The Transformation of Modern Corporations Law: The Law of Corporate Groups” (2004-
2005) 37:3 Conn. L. Rev. 605 at 606 (HEIN) [Blumberg]. 
81
 Tom Hadden, “The Regulation of Corporate Groups in Australia” (1992) 15 U.N.S.W.L.J. 61 at 64 [Hadden]. 
Accordingly, Haden states: “In some jurisdictions, of which Australia and Canada are good examples, it is more 
common for major groups to be structured in a more complex manner, with interlocking webs of majority and minority 
holdings which make it more difficult to assess accurately the profitability and solvency either of the group as a whole 
or of its constituent companies or to identify those who are formally responsible for their operations.” 
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privately-held companies may opt for a corporate group structure for various motives, 
including the limitation of liability for new ventures or for tax planning purposes.82   
The corporate group structure is particularly important in any analysis involving the 
conflict of interest faced by nominee directors as such conflict appears to be relatively 
frequent within these structures.83 Nominee directors face distinct difficulties in the 
corporate group context.84 The difficulties involving nominee directors within corporate 
groups stem from the fact that within these structures, it is the holding or parent company 
that generally harmonizes and governs the group.85 Thus, decision-making often depends 
on the best interests of the group as a whole.  As author Strasser notes:  
“a parent company creates, operates and dissolves subsidiaries 
primarily as part of a business strategy in pursuit of the business goals 
of the larger enterprise, which the parent and all the subsidiaries are 
pursuing together. […] The various companies in the corporate group 
are really fragments that collectively conduct the integrated enterprise 
under the coordination of the parent.”86  
Consequently, in view of the fact that the parent company needs to maintain control over 
the group, a frequently used method to ensure control is the appointment of nominees to 
the boards of each subsidiary.87 However, the nominees of corporate group subsidiaries 
will evidently be expected to govern each of the companies with a view to promoting the 
interests of the parent, or the corporate group as a whole, particularly in circumstances 
where the group operates as a single entity.88  
When there is no conflict between the interests of all the entities involved, operation is 
often harmonious and in the best interests of each entity; however, in circumstances 
where there is a conflict between the interests of the parent and those of one of its 
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 Ibid.  
83
 Robert Baxt & Timothy Lane “Developments in Relation to Corporate Groups and the Responsibility of Directors – 
Some Insights and New Directions” (1998) 16 C. & S.L.J. 628 at 629.   
84
 Simon Haddy, “A Comparative Analysis of Directors’ Duties in a Range of Corporate Structures” (2002) 20 
Company and Securities Law Journal 138 [Haddy]. 
85
 Sargent, supra note 74 at 158. 
86
 Kurt A. Strasser, “Piercing the veil in Corporate Groups” (2004-2005) 37 Conn. L. Rev. 637 at 638-639 (HEIN); 
accord Jonathan M. Landers, “A unified approach to Parent, Subsidiary, and Affiliate Questions in Bankruptcy” (1975) 
42:4 U. Chicago L. Rev. 589 (HEIN).  
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 Karen Yeung, “Corporate groups: legal aspects of the management dilemma” (1997) L.M.C.L.Q. 208 at 213 
[Yeung].  
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 Sargent, supra note 74; accord Hadden, supra note 81 at 77.  
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subsidiaries, the parent may instruct their nominee directors on the board of the 
subsidiary to act in a manner that does not coincide with the best interests of the 
subsidiary.89 Conversely, where a subsidiary nears insolvency, the parent may expressly 
instruct the directors not to rescue the subsidiary.90 Moreover, in circumstances where the 
subsidiary is partly-owned, minority shareholders and creditors may be unjustly treated.  
As Hadden notes, in practice, it will be arduous for minority shareholders of a subsidiary 
to ascertain that their interests have been disregarded in preference of the group’s 
interest.91  
Theoretically, the difficulty lies in that traditional legal principle, historically rooted in 
the case of Solomon v. Solomon and Company92, requires that the directors of a company, 
regardless of whether such company is part of a group, discharge their duties in the best 
interests of the company that they have been appointed to govern and must not 
subordinate them to any other interest, including those of a parent or affiliate company.93 
However, in practice, nominee directors will be expected to follow the instructions of the 
appointing parent.  
As such, traditional corporate law characterized by the “individual corporation” no 
longer reflects the realities of the modern day commercial entity.94 Hence, the reoccurring 
question and theme of this thesis resurfaces: how to reconcile legal principles with 
commercial reality?  These legal principles are translated into the nominee director’s 
statutory and common law duties owed to the company he has been appointed to govern. 
2.2 Overview of directors’ statutory duties  
In Canada, with the possible exception of Alberta95, nominee directors do not appear to 
benefit from any attenuated standards with respect to their duties and obligations as 
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 Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd. v. Meyer, (1959) A.C. 324 (QL) [Scottish Wholesale].  
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 Paul L. Davies, Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law, 7th ed. (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2003) 
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 Hadden, supra note 81 at 77. 
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company directors96 and like any other director, must govern with a view to the best 
interests of the company as a whole.97 As such, nominees are subject to the same duties 
and obligations required and expected of all company directors. 
Directors’ duties and obligations may be grouped into two general categories: (1) duties 
of care and skill; and (2) duties of loyalty and good faith.98 While these responsibilities 
find their early roots in case law, they have now been translated into most corporate 
statutes. At the federal level, directors’ duties have been laid down by way of Section 
122(1) of the CBCA99: 
122. (1) Every director and officer of a corporation in exercising their 
powers and discharging their duties shall : 
(a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of 
the corporation; and 
(b) exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent 
person would exercise in comparable circumstances. 
These duties are also reflected in provincial legislation across Canada. By way of 
example, a similar provision exists under Section 134(1) of the Ontario Business 
Corporations Act100, or, in Québec, under Articles 321, 322 and 2138 of the Civil Code of 
Québec (“C.C.Q.”).101 
While the duty of care and skill obliges directors to attend board meetings, maintain an 
active stance in the affairs of the company, remain adequately informed and up-to-date on 
company affairs and fulfill their role as supervisors of the company,102 it is the second 
group of duties that poses a particular problem to nominee directors.  The second group 
of duties is associated with the director’s position as a fiduciary of the company.  
Common law doctrinal commentary and case law has traditionally translated the 
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fiduciary duties into the director’s obligation to: (1) act bona fide in the company’s best 
interests; (2) not to fetter his discretion; (3) exercise his powers for proper purposes; and 
(4) avoid conflicts of interest.103 
2.2.1 Duty to act in the bona fide best interests of the company and to exercise their 
powers for a proper purpose 
The duty to act in the bona fide best interests of the company is unquestionably the most 
relevant with respect to nominee directors.  This duty has long stood as a cardinal rule 
overshadowing the conduct of all corporate directors.  In the 1854 House of Lords 
decision of Aberdeen Rail Co. v. Blaikie Brothers,104 Lord Cranworth, in determining 
whether the director’s conduct was in breach, reiterated this imperative duty to act, “as 
best to promote the interests of the corporation whose affairs they are conducting.” 
However, the question arises as to what exactly constitutes the “best interest of the 
corporation”?  As one author notes, the “best interests of the corporation” is not self-
defining, and thus the phrase could either be equated with the best interests of a 
corporation’s shareholders, or interpreted so as to include both shareholders as well as 
other corporate stakeholders.105 Thus, the phrase encompasses a spectrum of possibilities:  
“At one end of the spectrum is the most common account provided by 
law and economics scholars and other adopting a principal-agent 
model, where directors’ sole duty is to maximize the wealth of the 
shareholders, who are the owners of the corporation. […] At the other 
end of the spectrum, less popular rival progressive accounts suggest 
that directors should owe duties to all the corporation’s 
stakeholders.”106    
From a Canadian perspective, it appears that the best interests of the company were 
traditionally equated with the collective body of shareholders.107  While such a position 
appears to originate in late 19th to mid-20th century decisions rendered by the English 
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Chancery division,108 certain, although somewhat vague authority may also be evidenced 
in century-old Canadian decisions.109   
Despite this contention, authority in English and Australian case law appears to support 
the theory that, in certain circumstances, notably in the context of insolvency, creditor 
interests must also be considered by directors when acting in the best interests of the 
company.110 This consideration arguable challenges the traditional viewpoint that the best 
interests of the corporation are to be exclusively equated with those of the shareholders.  
A further evolution away from this shareholder primacy rule, has taken place in the U.S. 
in the form of legislative enactment.  Particularly, many states in the U.S. have adopted 
legislation, commonly referred to as “constituency statutes” so as to allow directors to 
consider the interests of other corporate stakeholders.111  
Although there has been no similar legislative enactment in Canada, a growing trend of 
case law appeared to reject the shareholder primacy theory.  This cumulated with the 
2004 Supreme Court of Canada decision in Peoples Department Stores Inc. v. Wise.112 In 
this decision, the court appeared to reject the traditional theory and invited directors to 
factor in the interests of various stakeholders. However, in Peoples v. Wise, the Supreme 
Court did not provide any further guidance on how directors may, in practice, govern the 
corporation.113 
More recently, the Supreme Court of Canada was given the opportunity to clarify their 
stance in connection with directors’ duties in a litigation involving BCE Inc.114 In brief, 
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BCE Inc., a public corporation held by 600,000 shareholders was involved in a dispute 
with the debenture holders of debentures issued by its subsidiary, Bell Canada, under 
three separate trust indentures.  In 2007, BCE entered into an agreement with Teachers’ 
Group.  The agreement was subsequently approved by BCE’s shareholders and the 
transaction was scheduled to close in 2008.  However, under Section 192 of the CBCA, 
the transaction was subject to the approval of the Superior Court of Québec.  Upon filing 
a motion for approval of the agreement, certain debenture holders contested the motion, 
claiming that the agreement significantly hindered their interests.  Concurrently, the 
debenture holders filed motions claiming oppression remedies under Section 241 of the 
CBCA as well as a declaration that would allow the trustees of the trust indentures a right 
of approval in connection with the transaction.  At the Superior Court level, the debenture 
holders’ contestation was dismissed and the transaction was approved.  However, the 
Superior Court judgement was subsequently appealed.  
At the appeal level, the Court of Appeal reversed the Superior Court’s decision on the 
grounds that BCE had not shown that the transaction was fair and reasonable in light of 
the circumstances.  On the issue of directors’ duties, the Québec Court of Appeal cited 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Peoples v. Wise and supported the premise that in acting 
in the best interests of the company, directors were not permitted to favour the interests of 
any one group of stakeholders but rather, they must act in the interests of the company as 
a whole.115  
The Québec Court of Appeal judgement appeared to be in synch with the bulk of the 
legal literature derived from the Peoples v. Wise decision, namely that in conducting 
themselves with a view to the corporations’ best interests, directors could no longer 
govern in the best interest of the shareholders.116  However, on appeal to the Supreme 
Court of Canada, the latter reversed the Court of Appeal decision and reaffirmed the 
Superior Court’s decision approving the transaction between BCE and the Teachers’ 
Group.  
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Despite approving the transaction, the Supreme Court of Canada reiterated and endorsed 
its position in Peoples v. Wise, namely that the directors of a corporation owe their 
primary allegiance to the corporation and not to the shareholders, or any one particular 
stakeholder.117 Although the Supreme Court again appeared to reject the shareholder 
primacy rule in favour of the fair and equitable treatment of all corporate stakeholders, it 
did note that the fiduciary duty is a broad and contextual concept that can vary depending 
on the circumstances.  Moreover, perhaps in justification of its decision to allow the 
transaction to proceed, the court indicated that although a board may consider the impact 
of its corporate decision-making on a particular group of stakeholders, such consideration 
is not in fact mandatory.118   
The Supreme Court also indicated that the business judgement rule and the reasonability 
of a corporate decision were primordial in determining whether a court should intervene.  
As such, so long as the decision lies within the “range of reasonable choices” the 
decision should not be challenged or overturned by the judiciary.119  
In view of the foregoing, attempting to define what constitutes the “best interests of the 
company” and in whose interests should a director govern, remains an arduous task.  
However, despite the uncertainties in relation to the identification of what constitutes 
these interests, one may nevertheless conclude that the latter may not be equated with a 
particular sectional interest.120 Although the BCE 1976 decision indicates that corporate 
decisions of directors should be attributed a high level of deference, directors may never 
give preference to one individual or controlling shareholder, nor may they simply act so 
as to please any one particular shareholder or even a non-shareholder constituency such 
as a major institutional investor.  Thus, in circumstances where a nominee director 
governs with a view to the best interests of his appointer, he is inherently in breach of his 
fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the company, regardless of the underlying 
uncertainty as to whom this duty is owed.  As put forth by Justice Thomas:  
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“[The nominee directors’] ability to carry out their duties as a 
director in good faith, and in the interests of the company as a whole, 
is at once compromised by their divided loyalty. Indeed, it is largely 
undermined if, as I suggest, their ultimate allegiance is in fact 
reserved for their appointers.”121 
It has also been put forth that the duty to act in the best interests of the company, as 
traditionally defined, may be the very motive for the appointment of nominee directors.122 
By way of example, in circumstances where the best interests of the company are equated 
with the best interests of shareholders generally, a non-shareholder constituency such as 
an institutional investor shall have every motive to appoint a director.  Hence, in absence 
of protection rooted in the fiduciary duty, what better way to ensure the protection of 
ones’ interest in a corporation?123 On the other hand, this may also be the motive for 
majority shareholders to appoint nominees; in absence of benefiting exclusively from the 
fiduciary duty, a majority shareholder may opt for additional protection.124 
The duty to exercise power for a proper purpose is also intrinsically linked to the duty to 
act in the best interests of the company.  This duty requires that company directors 
exercise their powers exclusively for the particular purpose for which such powers were 
granted.  Should a director exercise his powers for any other purpose, then he is guilty of 
an abuse of power and risks liability.125 There is debate as to whether the proper purpose 
rule still exists in Canada.126 Author Hansell notes that the Dickerson report’s 
recommendation to codify the fiduciary duty served to permanently abolish the proper 
purpose rule in Canada.127 Other doctrinal commentators also agree, noting that in 
Canada, the fiduciary duty approach (to act in the best interests of the corporation) has 
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replaced the proper purpose doctrine.128 Nonetheless, it appears that in certain cases, 
Canadian judges continue to apply the proper purpose rule.129 The proper purpose rule 
evidently also poses a problem for the nominee director in the same manner as the duty to 
act in the best interests of the corporation.  A nominee director who acts in the interest of 
his appointer cannot be acting exclusively for the purpose for which his powers were 
granted as a company director, even in circumstances where his appointer’s interests 
coincide with those of the company.  As such, nominee directors appear to be in constant 
conflict with the proper purpose rule when they conduct themselves in accordance with 
the interests of their appointer.  
2.2.2 Duty not to fetter their discretion 
This duty requires that directors exercise an active discretion and never agree, or contract, 
to exercise their future discretion in a certain way130: “a director in exercising the duties 
of a director is a trustee for the company, and must go to a directors’ meeting with a free 
mind and unbound.”131 The duty not to fetter discretion was reiterated in Lord Denning’s 
dissenting opinion in Boulting and Another v. Association of Cinematograph, Television 
and Allied Technicians as follows:    
“It seems to me that no one, who has duties of a fiduciary nature to 
discharge, can be allowed to enter into an engagement by which he 
binds himself to disregard those duties or to act inconsistently with 
them. No stipulation is lawful by which he agrees to carry out his 
duties in accordance with the instructions of another rather than on 
his own conscious judgment, or by which he agrees to subordinate the 
interests of those whom he must protect to the interests of someone 
else.”132  
Notwithstanding that the foregoing constituted a dissenting opinion; Lord Denning 
appeared to assert that the very notion of the duty not to fetter one’s discretion was 
incompatible with nominee directorship.  Thus, it would constitute a breach of the duty 
not to fetter his discretion in circumstances where the nominee contracts, whether 
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formally or informally, with an outsider, namely his appointer, to continuously vote or 
govern in accordance with his appointer’s wishes, or to consistently prefer his appointer’s 
interests to those of the corporation.133 
It is important to note that despite the director’s duty not to fetter his discretion, it is 
nonetheless frequent commercial practice that company directors enter into agreements in 
which they undertake to exercise their future discretion in accordance with such 
agreement.134 By way of example, shareholder and joint venture agreements often 
comprise such provisions, and these agreements are not necessarily contrary to public 
order.135  
It has been contended that a director’s duty not to fetter his discretion must be nuanced 
with the proposition that directors may exercise their future powers in accordance with an 
agreement, provided that, in so doing, they are acting in the best interests of the company 
as a whole.136  However, shareholder and joint venture agreements aside, the relationship 
between a nominee director and his appointer is generally not documented and thus the 
boundaries of their arrangement are often incalculable. Limitations aside, the nominee 
director’s relationship with his appointer is generally governed by the primary duty of 
loyalty to the appointer that constitutes in and of itself an impediment to the nominee 
director’s discretion.137  
Thus, in view of the duty not to fetter his discretion, one may query the extent to which a 
nominee may formally undertake to exercise his future discretion harmoniously with the 
wishes of his appointer, even if the latter’s wishes coincide with the best interests of the 
company. 
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2.2.3 Avoidance of conflicts of interest  
As part of their fiduciary duties, directors must avoid putting themselves in positions of 
conflict as well as potential conflicts of interest between the duties owed to the 
corporation and any other interest to which a director may be bound to consider.138  As 
such, conflicts of interest may be grouped into two basic categories: (1) conflicts between 
the interests of the company and a director’s personal interests; and (2) conflicts between 
the interests of the company and the interests of an outside party for whom the director 
has undertaken to act for, or on behalf of.139 A director who has a close personal 
relationship with an outside party with a conflicting interest is also considered offside for 
the purposes of this rule.140 Given that nominee directors are most often implicitly bound 
by the interests of their appointer, they are inherently in breach of the duty to avoid 
conflicts of interest. 
2.3 Chapter summary 
This second chapter endeavoured to point out specific economic characteristics that may 
explain the prevalence of nominee directorship, particularly in Canada. Empirical 
evidence illustrating a corporate culture characterized by concentrated ownership and 
corporate group structures was emphasized.  The succeeding half of this chapter provided 
a synopsis of those directors’ duties that make the nominee director’s position 
particularly problematic, predominantly the duty to act in the bona fide best interests of 
the company, the duty not to fetter their discretion and the duty to avoid conflicts of 
interest.  
The overview of these economic and legal characteristics was provided so as to 
exemplify the unresolved difficulty at the heart of this analysis; specifically, that the 
company director’s imperative duties contrast with the very nature of nominee 
directorship.  The following chapter is devoted to examining the different judicial 
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approaches that have been developed in response to the conflict of interest faced by 
nominee directors.    
 28 
3. JUDICIAL APPROACHES TOWARDS NOMINEE DIRECTORSHIP 
Despite the inherent difficulties associated with nominee directorship, the practice of 
appointing them does not appear to be in-and-of itself prohibited.  As noted in the 
introductory chapter, such practice is implicitly recognized in various company statutes, 
as well as in judicial authority; as Lord Denning himself once stated, “there is nothing 
wrong with it. It is done everyday.”141 Accordingly, the courts appear to have recognized 
that a director may, in certain circumstances, owe potentially conflicting duties.142  
However, the reconciliation of these duties poses a serious theoretical problem.  As noted 
in the preceding chapter, as a fiduciary, a director must always discharge his duties in the 
best interests of the company and abstain from fettering his discretion, both present and 
future; however, it would be absurd not to recognize that the nominee shall naturally 
govern with his appointer’s interest in mind.  Does this imply that nominee directorship is 
purely a psychological problem?  Although the psychological decision-making process of 
nominee directors is undoubtedly affected,143 various decisions do in fact illustrate that 
the dual loyalty faced by nominee directors does on occasion give rise to serious practical 
difficulties.144   
 
In light of the foregoing, over the past several decades, different judicial approaches have 
emerged with the objective of resolving the inherent conflict characteristic of the position 
of nominee directors.  These approaches may be identified as: (1) the “strict view”; (2) 
the “pragmatic view”; and (3) the view based upon an examination of the company’s 
constituent and other related documents (such as a shareholders’ or a joint venture 
agreement) so as to determine the appropriate scope of applicable duties.145  
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While the aforementioned approaches have been structured and elaborated upon by 
various doctrinal commentators over the years, they nonetheless find their early roots in 
common law case law. The following paragraphs shall explore each of these different 
approaches, culminating with an attempt to reconcile them. 
3.1 The strict view 
In essence, the strict view requires that a nominee director act solely in the best interests 
of the company that he has been appointed to govern.146 As such, this approach does not 
permit “hindered judgement as to the best interests of the company and dictates that the 
duty to the company prevails.”147 Furthermore, according to the strict view, the nominee 
director may never benefit from an attenuated or divergent scope of his fiduciary duties 
and is not to be treated any differently from directors at large.148  
A starting point for the examination of this approach must necessarily commence with an 
overview of the 1959 House of Lords decision in Scottish Co-operative Wholesale 
Society Ltd. v. Meyer.149 This decision is often designated as classic authority for 
application of the strict view.150   
In this decision, the Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society decided to form a 
subsidiary company for the exclusive purposes of its textiles operations, ranging from 
fabrication to retail inclusively.  The subsidiary was formed between the society and two 
of the society’s employees, named Meyer and Lucas, in view of the fact that Meyer and 
Lucas possessed the experience and connections required to successfully run the 
subsidiary.  Upon its incorporation, the subsidiary issued a controlling share interest to 
the society, while Meyer and Lucas were each attributed with a minority interest.  
Moreover, the subsidiary’s board was comprised of 5 directors, 3 of which were 
nominees of the society, appointed in accordance with the subsidiary’s articles, while the 
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other two board members were Meyer and Lucas themselves.  The subsidiary essentially 
received its supplies directly from a division of the society and was responsible for all 
subsequent operations, from manufacturing the materials to merchandising of the final 
products.  
Given that the subsidiary performed quite prosperously, the society attempted to procure 
the shares of Meyer and Lucas.  However, in absence of Meyer and Lucas’s collaboration 
to sell back their shares, the society resolved to bring down the subsidiary, through the 
conduct of its nominee directors. As such, the society formed its own division to carry 
out the same textile operations that were otherwise performed by the subsidiary and 
began diverting all of its materials and supplies to its new division for manufacturing, 
fabrication and merchandising.  Furthermore, the society refused to continue supplying 
the subsidiary with the necessary materials at reasonable prices.  As such, Meyer and 
Lucas instituted legal proceedings against the society, alleging oppression under the then 
1948 Companies Act.  
Both the trial division and the House of Lords, in a unanimous judgment, held that the 
society and its nominee directors had engaged in oppressive conduct.  In his motives, 
Viscount Simmons attributed particular blame to the society’s nominee directors, given 
that they were well aware of the society’s plan to destroy the subsidiary yet they chose to 
simply remain silent and refuse to take action.151  
Concurrent with Viscount Simmons was Lord Denning, who described the position of 
nominee directors as follows:  
“What, then, is the position of the nominee directors here? […] So 
long as the interests of all concerned were in harmony, there was no 
difficulty.  The nominee directors could do their duty by both 
companies without embarrassment. But, so soon as the interests of the 
two companies were in conflict, the nominee directors were placed in 
an impossible position. […] They probably thought that "as nominees" 
of the co-operative society their first duty was to the co-operative 
society. In this they were wrong. By subordinating the interests of the 
textile company to those of the co-operative society, they conducted 
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the affairs of the textile company in a manner oppressive to the other 
shareholders.”152 
Lord Denning also reproached the nominee directors for their inaction, stating that in 
such circumstances, their passivity towards the subsidiary amounted to oppressive 
conduct.153  
It has been contended that the Scottish Co-operative decision is illustrative of the strict 
view in that the House of Lords did not acknowledge, nor did it permit any attenuation of 
the nominee director’s duty to act in the best interests of the company.154 Furthermore, it 
has been submitted that Lord Denning appears to advise that in circumstances of conflict, 
the nominee director has no other choice but to resign, given Denning’s characterization 
of the nominee directors’ situation as “impossible”.155 However, subsequent to this 
characterization, Lord Denning deliberated upon what the nominee directors may have 
done differently under such circumstances.  Namely, the directors could have protested 
against the society’s decision to open up a competing division and to focus on the 
protection of the subsidiary, even if this resulted in their termination or forced resignation 
as directors.  
The strict approach has been categorized as irreconcilable with commercial reality, given 
that it is both unrealistic and unreasonable not to acknowledge that a nominee director 
shall always govern with his appointer’s interests at heart, whether or not his appointer’s 
interests coincide with the best interests of the company.156  Moreover, requiring a 
director to resign in every case of conflict is an impractical alternative.157 As author 
Crutchfield fluently notes: 
“It is submitted that if [the strict approach] is the law, it imposes a 
standard which makes the position of nominee directors impossible. It 
ignores the commercial reality of the appointment of nominee 
directors and the reality that in making their decisions, they will often 
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have regards to the interests and act upon the wishes of their 
appointer.”158  
Crutchfield also contends that such an approach demonstrates a lack of trust in the 
powers of the equitable doctrine and its flexibility in adapting to the particularities of 
each case.159  
Perhaps the motive behind their Lordships’ particularly uncompromising stance in 
Scottish Co-operative was the blatantly transparent bad faith of the society and its 
nominee directors.  Given the particular circumstances, it could be hypothesized that the 
court decided to highlight the intolerability of such conduct by the justice system.  As one 
author notes, it is not certain whether Lord Denning’s comments in the Scottish Co-
operative decision where intended to apply beyond the scope of that decision, given the 
particular circumstances.160  
However, subsequent to Scottish Co-operative, Lord Denning appeared to restate his 
support for the strict view in Boulting and Another v. Cinematograph, Television and 
Allied Technicians.161 Conversely, the majority judges in this latter case did not adhere to 
Lord Denning’s view and opted for a more relaxed stance towards the nominees.162 In 
fact, in the Boulting decision, the majority judges indicated that, notwithstanding the 
potential for conflict, it may actually be in the corporation’s advantage to have an outside 
nominee on the board. As per the majority: “Directors, trustees or solicitors may 
sometimes be placed in such a position that though their interest and duty conflict, they 
can properly and honestly give their services to both sides and serve two masters to the 
great advantage of both.”163 The court did indicate that in such circumstances, full 
disclosure of the potential for conflict is evidently necessary.  
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Although, the strict view has been characterized as being the traditionally favoured 
approach towards nominee directors in the U.K.,164 there are decisions involving nominee 
directors in the other jurisdictions researched, namely in Australia, New Zealand and 
Canada that also provide support for this view.  
In Australia, despite the conception of a more liberal approach,165 the strict view has 
nonetheless received a certain line of judicial support.166 Historically illustrative of such 
support is the case of Bennetts v. Board of Fire Commissioner of New South Wales.167 In 
brief, the case involved the Fire Commissions, a statutory corporation with the mandate 
of preventing and protecting against fires.  Consistent with its governing legislation, the 
Fire Commissions’ board consisted of 5 nominee directors, each having been mandated 
to represent a sectional interest, such as those of the insurance companies as well as those 
of the permanent firemen comprised in the employee union.   
Subsequent to an unfavourable decision regarding the application for an award 
undertaken by the employee union, the Fire Commissions’ finance committee, made up 
of select board members, held a meeting to decide whether or not to appeal the decision 
concerning the award.  During the meeting, the finance committee met with legal counsel 
to discuss the prospects of such an appeal, and then met with the whole board and made a 
recommendation to appeal.  Mr. Bennetts, the nominee director of the permanent firemen 
comprised in the employee union requested to consult the legal counsel’s opinion on the 
appeal issue.  The chairman of the board agreed, on condition that Mr. Bennetts would 
not disclose the legal opinion to the employee union.  However, Mr. Bennetts refused, 
and thus the board resolved to adopt the finance committee’s recommendation despite the 
dissent of two directors including Mr. Bennetts.  
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Mr. Bennetts instituted legal proceedings requesting that the board’s decision to withhold 
the legal opinion in connection with the recommendation to appeal and the resolution to 
launch an appeal be invalidated by the court.  Mr. Bennetts also requested an injunction 
prohibiting the board from launching an appeal.  
The Supreme Court of New South Wales, presided by Justice Street, was quick to reject 
the proceedings.  The court held that the overriding duty of the board members should 
always be to the company in absence of any possible concessions:  
“[The nominee director’s] position as a board member is not to be 
used as a mere opportunity to serve the group which elected him. […] 
Once the group has elected a member he assumes office as a member 
of the board and becomes subject to the overriding and predominant 
duty to serve the interests of the board in preference, on every 
occasion upon which any conflict might arise, to serving the interests 
of the group which appointed him. With this basic proposition there 
can be no room for compromise.”168  
In spite of the foregoing, it is important to distinguish that this case dealt with a statutory 
corporation mandated with a public purpose.  Justice Street gave particular attention to 
the status of the corporation in his analysis, referring to the primary consideration of the 
board as “the advancement of the public purpose for which parliament has set up the 
board”, as well as the obligation to serve the community.169  Hence, one may question 
whether the court’s conclusions would have differed had the entity in question been 
private.  Moreover, Mr Bennetts openly admitted to the fact that he would breach his duty 
of confidentiality as a director by reporting back to his appointer, a fact that likely 
influenced the court’s stance against him.170     
In Australia, the Bennetts decision does not stand alone in support of this stricter stance 
towards the position of nominee directors.  In Harkness v. Commonwealth Bank of 
Australia, another decision involving an alleged breach of duty by certain nominee 
directors, Justice Young of the New South Wales Supreme Court noted that “the law as 
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stated in the Bennett's case has, as far as I am aware, been universally accepted.”171 
Support, albeit scarce, is also apparent in New Zealand authority.172 Although the 
favoured theoretical approach towards nominee directors is uncertain in the Canadian 
context, support for a stricter approach is also perceptible.173  
Generally, in Canada, it has been contended that the nominee director must always serve 
the best interest of the corporation, irrespective of his appointer’s wishes.174 In one of the 
first reported cases that touched on this issue, British Columbia Power Corporation Ltd. 
v. Attorney-General of British Columbia et al., the nominee directors of a power 
corporation were accused of having ignored the interests of the minority shareholders in 
favour of the wishes of their appointing shareholder, being the Government of British 
Columbia.175  The Supreme Court of British Columbia referred to the Scottish Wholesale 
decision and concluded that the nominee directors had not satisfied their duties towards 
the shareholders generally in having acted exclusively for their appointer.176  However, 
the court did not elaborate on the position or duties of nominee directors. 
A wave of reported litigation involving nominee directors subsequently arose in both 
Québec and Ontario in the early to mid-1990s.  In Québec, one of these decision, dealt 
with a certain nominee director who was refused director indemnification under the 
CBCA in view of his conduct.177  The Québec Court of Appeal confirmed the trial 
judge’s decision, essentially denying indemnification on the basis that the nominee 
director had acted in the interests of his appointer.  In so doing, the nominee director had 
failed to fulfill his principal duty of loyalty to the corporation and as such, was denied all 
indemnification benefits.  Moreover, the court condemned the nominee director’s conduct 
as improper, dishonest and contrary to the benefit of the corporation as a whole and 
indicated that such conduct cannot be considered to have been in good faith.  
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In Ontario, the courts appear to have taken a more compromising stance towards nominee 
directors, illustrative in a trilogy of cases that emerged in the early 1990s.  Often cited as 
Canadian authority on the duties of nominee directors is the Ontario Court of Justice’s 
decision in 820099 Ontario Inc. v. Harold E. Ballard Ltd.178 In this decision, E. Ballard 
Limited was created by the late Harold E. Ballard as a holding corporation to hold his 
interests in Maple Leaf Gardens Limited, a corporation he acquired in the early 1960s.  
Several years later, Mr. Ballard reorganized the capital structure of E. Ballard Limited 
with a view to transferring his holdings to his children, while retaining voting control of 
the company in the form of preferred shares.  
However, in the late 1980’s, Mr. Ballard desired to reacquire the interests in E. Ballard 
Limited that were then held by his three children in the form of common shares pursuant 
to the reorganization of the capital structure that he had conducted years earlier.  Thus, 
Mr. Ballard, along with two of his nominee directors, also his employees and personal 
friends, concocted several transactions to allow Mr. Ballard to reacquire the majority of 
the outstanding common shares of E. Ballard Limited from his children.  
Subsequent to these transactions, one of Mr. Ballard’s children, William Ballard along 
with 820099 Ontario Inc., both minority shareholders of E. Ballard Limited launched an 
application seeking an oppression remedy under Section 247 of the Business 
Corporations Act.179 The applicants essentially complained that the affairs of E. Ballard 
Limited were unfairly conducted by the directors in a manner that was oppressive to their 
interests.  The applicants also alleged that Mr. Ballard’s nominee directors owed their 
primary allegiance to Mr. Ballard and as such, they were conducting the affairs of E. 
Ballard Limited in breach of their fiduciary duties.    
The Ontario Court of Justice granted the application with respect to the wrongful conduct 
of the nominee directors.  The court, presided by Justice Farley, commenced its analysis 
by restating the applicable legislation with respect to directors’ duties, and particularly 
their duty not to fetter their discretion and to act in the best interests of the company for 
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which they were elected to govern.180  Justice Farley applied the Scottish Co-operative 
case to ultimately conclude that the actions of the nominee directors were in breach of 
their fiduciary duties to the company.  Specifically with respect to the issue of nominee 
directors, Justice Farley noted that: 
“It may well be that the corporate life of a nominee director who votes 
against the interest of his ‘appointing’ shareholder will be neither 
happy nor long. However, the role that any director must play 
(whether or not a nominee director) is that he must act in the best 
interests of the corporation. […] The nominee director cannot be a 
‘Yes man’; he must be an analytical person who can say ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ 
as the occasion requires (or to put it another way, as the corporation 
requires).”181 
Justice Farley did indicate that a nominee director is not prohibited from considering the 
individual interests of his appointing shareholder with respect to corporate decision-
making; rather, it is the director’s preference of the appointing shareholder’s interests to 
those of the company that should be sanctioned.  Farley advised that the cautious 
approach to avoid such conflict would be for directors to simply govern in the best 
interests of the company.  Furthermore, he appeared to suggest that the following query 
could determine whether the director was in breach of his duties: What was it that the 
nominee director had uppermost in his mind after a reasonable analysis of the 
situation?182  If the answer to this question is the appointer’s interest, then it appears that 
the director is in breach of his fiduciary duties. 
Following the Ontario Superior Court of Justice’s decision in 820099 v. Ballard, the 
second decision in the trilogy of Ontario case law involving the conduct of nominee 
directors was Deluce Holdings Inc. v. Air Canada.183 In this decision, the court was again 
quick to disapprove of the reprehensible conduct of the nominee directors involved in the 
litigation who had acted exclusively in the interests of their appointer.  
In this case, Air Canada and the Deluce family held an indirect interest in Air Ontario 
Inc. by way of a holding company.  Accordingly, Air Canada held a 75% indirect interest 
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in Air Ontario while the Deluce family, through Deluce Holdings Inc., held the remaining 
25%.  Air Canada had seven nominees on Air Ontario’s board of directors while Deluce 
Holdings Inc. had three nominees.  At the onset of the deal, it was decided that a member 
of the Deluce family, William Deluce would occupy the duties of president and chief 
executive officer, and would be responsible for running Air Ontario while Air Canada 
would remain dissociated from the day-to-day administration.  It is important to note that 
a unanimous shareholders’ agreement granted Air Canada an option of acquiring the 
interest of Deluce Holdings Inc. advent the termination of employment of Mr. Deluce and 
his father, Stanley Deluce.  
In April 1991, Air Canada decided to acquire complete control of Air Ontario.  Thus, in 
October 1991, Air Canada representatives met with Mr. Deluce and requested that the 
latter resign.  Mr. Deluce rejected Air Canada’s request.  Thus, Air Ontario’s board of 
directors, composed by a majority of Air Canada’s nominees, passed a resolution to 
terminate Mr. Deluce’s employment.  Subsequently, Deluce Holdings Inc. launched an 
application for an oppression remedy under Section 241 of the CBCA.  The issue of 
whether or not Air Canada’s nominee directors had acted reasonably and in compliance 
with their fiduciary duties was at the heart of these proceedings.   
Justice Blair, of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, asserted agreement with both the 
Scottish Co-operative and 820099 v. Ballard decisions to conclude that the Air Canada 
nominee directors’ conduct was oppressive.  Accordingly, Blair approved of the query, as 
cited by Justice Farley in 820099 v. Ballard, namely what it was the directors “had 
uppermost in their minds after a reasonable analysis of the situation”.184  Under the 
circumstances, Justice Blair concluded that no reasonable analysis of the situation was 
undertaken from the perspective of Air Ontario’s best interests.  Rather the Air Canada 
nominee directors had unjustly disregarded the interests of Deluce Holdings Inc., as a 
minority shareholder, and had conducted themselves purely in favour of their appointer’s 
interest: 
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“[...] the evidence here strongly supports a conclusion that, in causing the 
[Company’s] Board to terminate the employment of [William], the Air 
Canada nominees were acting to carry out an Air Canada agenda and made 
little, if any, analysis of what was in the best interests of [the Company]. 
Whether, had they done so, such an analysis might have yielded sufficient 
reason from [the Company’s] perspective to carry out the termination, is not 
the point.”185 
Interestingly, the resolution to terminate Mr. Deluce did not appear to directly harm Air 
Ontario in any way; rather, it appeared to be a viable business decision, likely undertaken 
by Air Canada executives as a strategy to retain control.  Thus, contrary to the situation in 
Scottish Co-operative, where the nominee directors were mandated to bring down the 
subsidiary, the intent behind the nominee directors’ conduct in the Deluce Holdings case 
could be categorized as a justified business decision.  However, whether or not the 
nominee directors’ decision was ultimately in the best interests of Air Ontario, did not 
appear to significantly influence the court.  Rather, it was the fact that the directors had 
not conducted a “reasonable analysis of the situation” from that perspective.186 
Merely one year later, the third decision concluding this trilogy, also emerged from the 
Ontario Court of Justice and again involved Air Canada.187 In this decision, Air Canada 
and PWA Corporation, along with a third partner, Covia Canada Partnership Corp., 
together formed a limited partnership, Gemini Group Limited Partnership, for the 
purposes of implementing and operating a new reservations system.  One of the main 
competitors of the new reservations system was the renowned American Sabre system.   
Each of the three limited partners held a 33% interest in Gemini, while the general 
partner, a company responsible for the management of Gemini, held the remaining 1%.  
Furthermore, Air Canada, PWA and Covia were each allotted the right to nominate three 
directors to Gemini’s board.  
Subsequently, PWA’s nominee directors started negotiating with the parent company of 
American Airlines Inc., with the objective of switching PWA’s reservations system to the 
American Sabre system.  The PWA nominees on the Gemini board did not disclose these 
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negotiations to the rest of the Gemini board and subsequently launched proceedings 
requesting the dissolution of the limited partnership.  PWA’s proceedings were denied at 
both the trial and appeal levels. In both instances, the courts elaborated on the issue of 
nominee directors.  
At the trial level, the court followed both Scottish Co-operative and 820099 Ontario to 
conclude that the PWA nominees had clearly breached their fiduciary duties owed to 
Gemini by entering into the confidentiality agreement with American and subsequently 
failing to disclose to the Gemini board the negotiations with American.188 Furthermore, 
Justice Callaghan, of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, took on a rather 
uncompromising approach with respect to the conflict of interest faced by the nominee 
directors, stating that they were placed in an “untenable position” leaving them with no 
other choice but to resign as directors.189 Callaghan also suggested that in such 
circumstances, namely where an appointer instructs his nominee directors to act in a 
manner that is inconsistent with their fiduciary duties, the appointer should also be held 
liable for the wrongful conduct of his nominees.  However, the issue of appointer liability 
was not contemplated any further.    
The PWA decision was appealed and although the Court of Appeal ultimately confirmed 
the trial decision, it appeared to take on a more compromising stance, particularly with 
respect to the issue of the nominee directors’ breach of disclosure obligations to the 
Gemini board.190  In fact, at the appeal level, the court appeared to conclude that the trial 
judge had imposed too high a standard with respect to the fiduciary duties owed by the 
nominee directors to Gemini.191  Thus, the court appeared to restrict the unlawful conduct 
giving rise to the breach as the specific failure to disclose “the part of the negotiations 
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with [American] which affected the Gemini partnership in a vital aspect of its 
business.”192   
Although the trilogy of Ontario decisions all applied Scottish Co-operative; the PWA 
appeal decision appears illustrative of a more conciliatory stance.  However, under all 
circumstances, the case law indicates that nominee directors must owe their primary 
allegiance to the company.  
In Wood v. C.F.N. Precision Inc., on a motion for summary judgement, the Ontario 
Superior Court of Justice was called upon to examine the conduct of a nominee director 
so as to determine whether such nominee had compromised his independence and 
breached his fiduciary duties in causing an employment contract with the company to be 
terminated.193 While the court did not oppose the position of the nominee director, it did 
stress that there was a fine line between taking an appointer’s advice and acting in 
accordance with an appointer’s direction.194  The court noted that ultimately, the nominee 
must always conduct himself in the bona fide best interest of the corporation.  
Canadian cases illustrative of the strict view do not appear to attribute nominee directors 
with any attenuation of their fiduciary duties; nominees must govern, as every director, 
with the view to the best interests of the corporation under all circumstances195 and at the 
very least, must always undertake a reasonable analysis of the situation from that 
perspective.196  
The Scottish Co-operative case as applied in 820099 v. Ballard appears to remain valid 
authority as regards the conduct of nominee directors in Canada.197 By way of example, 
in Tal v. Lifemark Health Inc., a litigation involving a corporation on the brink of 
insolvency and the majority shareholder’s right to nominate two directors onto the board, 
Justice Farley requested the majority shareholder’s nominees to certify that they have 
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read and have understood, and agree to govern by those guiding principles formulated in 
820099 v. Ballard and further confirm that they will not release any confidential 
information to anybody, including their appointer.198  Moreover, the Scottish Co-
operative decision was more recently referenced in the Ontario Superior Court decision 
of Ellins v. Conventree Inc., another oppression case involving a nominee director’s 
misconduct in a subsidiary corporation.199   
Notwithstanding the foregoing, there has been disagreement and criticism of the strict 
view as formulated in Scottish Co-operative, particularly in Australia, where it appears 
that a more pragmatic approach has been embraced.200        
3.2 The pragmatic view  
The pragmatic approach to nominee directorship has its roots in two pivotal decisions 
rendered in the 1960s by the Supreme Court of New South Wales.201 It has been 
contended that these two judgments have provided both legitimacy to the practice of 
nominee directorship and have allowed the attenuation of the fiduciary duties imposed on 
these directors.202  
Essentially, the pragmatic view provides nominee directors with more latitude in 
allowing them to consider the interests of their appointers provided that such interests do 
not run contrary to the company’s best interests.203 The pragmatic view also permits an 
attenuated standard of loyalty in certain circumstances.   
The first decision, illustrative of the pragmatic view, is the 1962 decision of Levin v. 
Clark.204 The facts of this case involved a company, Argus Investments Pty Ltd., the 
majority shares of which were subsequently purchased by the plaintiff, Aage Levin, by 
virtue of a sale and mortgage agreement, executed concurrently.  Prior to the sale, the 
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vendors appointed two directors to which they bestowed broad powers, consistent with 
the company’s articles.  Furthermore, in order to guarantee the purchase price for the 
shares, it was agreed upon that the nominee directors would remain on the board but 
would abstain from active participation in the company unless Levin defaulted under the 
mortgage agreement.  As such, exclusively in the case of default, the nominee directors 
would be restored with their broad governing powers.  The articles of the company were 
consequently amended so as to validate the foregoing situation.  
Thus, upon execution of the sale agreement, the nominee directors announced their 
retirement from active participation in the company’s affairs and Levin along with 
several other directors, were appointed to the board by various corporate resolutions.  
Subsequently, Levin defaulted under the mortgage agreement and as such, the nominee 
directors returned to active participation as governing directors.  Levin instituted legal 
proceedings to challenge the nominee directors from returning to active participation; he 
advanced several arguments including the contention that the nominee directors were 
acting in the sole interests of the mortgagee, rather than in the interests of the company. 
The Supreme Court of New South Wales dismissed the plaintiff’s action on several 
grounds.  The court acknowledged that the nominee directors had conducted themselves 
in the interests of the mortgagee; yet the court nonetheless took an arguable more 
permissible and realistic position on the conduct of these nominees.  As the presiding 
Justice Jacobs indicated: 
“It is not uncommon for a director to be appointed to a board of 
directors in order to represent an interest outside the company – a 
mortgagee or other trader of a particular shareholder. It may be in the 
interests of the company that there be upon its board of directors one 
who will represent these other interests and who will be acting solely 
in the interests of such a third party and who may in that way be 
properly regarded as acting in the interests of the company as a 
whole. […] It does not follow, in my opinion, that by acting in the 
interests of the mortgagee, and solely in the interests of the mortgagee, 
those directors necessarily cease to act in the interests of the company. 
Certainly they may cease to act in the interests of the plaintiff, and 
admittedly the plaintiff is the registered holder of the shares, but it 
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would be quite artificial to ignore the interests of the mortgagee in 
these circumstances.”205  
Furthermore, Jacobs J. also held that the degree or standard of applicable fiduciary duties 
should be evaluated in each particular situation.  According to Jacobs, amidst the most 
significant of these circumstances are the “terms of the instrument governing the exercise 
by the fiduciary of his powers and duties and wishes […]”206 In the case at bar, the 
governing instruments were the sale agreement and the company’s articles which were 
purposefully amended so as to ensure the protection of the mortgagee’s rights in the event 
of default, expressly through the powers of the nominee directors.  
In view of the foregoing, the Levin decision expressly allowed the nominee directors to 
act in the interests of their appointer.  Furthermore, it was held that under the 
circumstances, attenuation of the nominee directors’ fiduciary duties was permissible.207   
It has been reasoned that the degree of permissibility illustrative in Levin v. Clark is 
attributable to the fact that the court indicated that a company’s articles may modify the 
duties of nominee directors so as to allow promotion of outside interests concurrently 
with those of a company.208  However, in the forthcoming second decision historically 
illustrative of the pragmatic view, the articles of association were silent with respect to 
the applicable standard of fiduciary duties of nominee directors.  
In Re Broadcasting Station 2GB Pty Ltd., the Supreme Court of New South Wales was 
again faced with a suit contending the breach of the nominee directors’ fiduciary duties 
that resulted in the alleged oppression of the minority shareholders.209  The facts leading 
up to this decision are somewhat complex and therefore a simplified overview follows. 
At the onset of the relevant timeframe, Broadcasting Station 2GB Pty Ltd.,  a company 
operating a commercial broadcasting station, was composed of a shareholding distributed 
in the following manner: 45% was held by Broadcasting Associates Pty., a corporate 
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shareholder of Broadcasting Station that was ultimately controlled by English interests, 
14% was attributed to John Fairfax and Sons Pty Ltd., another corporate shareholder and 
subsidiary of John Fairfax Ltd., and the remaining shares were held amongst various 
minority shareholders.  Furthermore, Broadcasting Station’s articles contained a 
provision under which the Fairfax group was permitted to appoint a director on the board.  
Additionally, evidence at trial demonstrated that the board was also composed of four 
nominees representing the English interests and one other nominee representing the 
interests of the minority shareholders.  The ninth member of the board, and also 
managing director did not represent any particular interests. 
In 1958, the English interests sold their indirectly controlled shares to A.T.V. (Australia) 
Pty Ltd., a wholly owned subsidiary of Associated Television of England. The nominees 
of the English interests continued on as directors of Broadcasting Station and regarded 
themselves as now being the nominee directors of A.T.V.  However, several years later, 
in 1964, the Fairfax group proceeded with a series of acquisitions that included the 
purchase of Associated Television of England’s interests, including the 45% shares held 
by its subsidiary A.T.V. in Broadcasting Station.  This resulted in the Fairfax group 
acquiring a 60% majority share interest in Broadcasting Station.  
Accordingly, the Fairfax group requested the resignation of all directors of A.T.V., 
including the resignation of A.T.V.’s nominee directors, formerly the representatives of 
the English interests.  However, two of the four nominees refused to resign declaring that 
they no longer represented a particular shareholder but rather that they were equally 
responsible representatives of all shareholders.210 In view of their refusal, the Fairfax 
group concocted a procedure pursuant to which additional directors, also representatives 
of the Fairfax group, would be appointed to the board.  Furthermore, a series of 
supplementary resolutions were adopted, in spite of the opposition by two of the A.T.V. 
nominees who had refused to resign.  As well, a request by the A.T.V. nominees and the 
director representing the interests of the minority shareholders, for the disclosure of 
certain corporate information, was met with a swift rejection by the majority of the board.  
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As such, one of the nominee directors instituted legal proceedings alleging that the affairs 
of Broadcasting Station were being unfairly conducted by the Fairfax group nominee 
directors in the sole interests of the Fairfax group without any regard to the interests of 
Broadcasting Station as a whole, and in a manner that was oppressive to the minority 
shareholders including the A.T.V. nominees who were shareholders themselves.   
The New South Wales Supreme Court, again presided by Justice Jacobs, reiterated the 
director’s duty to govern in the best interests of the company, ordinarily identified with 
the interests of the majority shareholders given that “the system of election of directors is 
intended to achieve this result of majority rule.”211 The court held that the nominees of 
the Fairfax group had not conducted themselves in a reprehensible manner given that 
there was no evidence that the directors had acted inconsistently with the best interests of 
the company:  
“It may well be, and I am inclined to regard it as the fact, that the 
newly appointed directors were prepared to accept the position that 
would follow the wishes of the Fairfax interests without a close 
personal analysis of the issues […] but I see no evidence of a lack in 
them of a bona fide belief that the interests [of the Fairfax Groups] 
were identical with the interests of the company as a whole. I realize, 
that upon this approach, I deny any right in the company as a whole to 
have each director approach each company problem with a 
completely open mind, but I think that to require this of each director 
of a company is to ignore the realities of company organization. Also, 
such requirement would, in effect, make the position of the nominee or 
representative director an impossibility.”212  
Jacobs also noted that the attention should be shifted towards the Fairfax group rather 
than their nominees, given that it was the Fairfax group who was ultimately determining 
the fate of Broadcasting Station.213  This appears to suggest that even if the nominees had 
conducted themselves wrongfully, it should be the appointers that are held liable. 
However, Jacobs ruled that there was no evidence of oppressive conduct on the part of 
the appointers.   
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Broadcasting Station should be distinguished from Levin v. Clark; in the former case, the 
corporation did not contain articles that provided any guidelines with respect to the 
manner in which the nominees were to conduct themselves, nor did they provide for an 
attenuation of the nominee director’s fiduciary duties. According to the pragmatic view 
as applied in Broadcasting Station, the conduct of nominee directors will not be 
sanctioned so long as they have a bona fide belief that their conduct, generally in 
accordance with the wishes of their appointers, is not contrary to the best interests of the 
company.214  As per Justice Thomas, on the basis of Levin and Broadcasting Station, 
“nominee directors need not necessarily approach company problems with an open mind 
and may pursue their appointers’ interests provided that, in the event of a conflict, they 
prefer the interests of the company of which they are a director.”215   
It is important to note that in the Broadcasting Station case, the court indicated that the 
best interests of the company were to be equated with the interests of the majority 
shareholders.  However, this premise has been rejected in Canada.216 As such, it is 
questionable whether the pragmatic view in its most liberal formulation could ever be 
applicable in the Canadian context.   
Nonetheless, Justice Jacobs view in Broadcasting Station was cited with approval in 
several successive Australian cases.217 By way of example, in Re Application of the News 
Corp. Ltd., the court indicated that to require a nominee director to approach each 
problem with a completely open mind was impossible and that it was acceptable to 
expect that such directors govern in the interests of their appointers provided that such is 
not contrary to the interests of the company as a whole.218  
In Morgan v. 45 Fleurs Avenue Pty Ltd.219, it was alleged that a nominee director was 
acting exclusively in the interests of his appointer when exercising his voting power as 
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the director of the company he was nominated to govern.  The Supreme Court of New 
South Wales, this time presided by Justice Young, did not agree and indicated that:  
“A person who is what might be called a nominee director, may 
legitimately exercise his votes on a board in the interests of the 
person who appointed him without being in breach of a fiduciary 
duty to the company on whose board he sits.”220  
Moreover, in Molomby v. Whitehead, it was held that unless a director was clearly in a 
situation of conflict; such director should be treated as any other and should not be denied 
access to corporate information.221  
The pragmatic view has also received judicial support in New Zealand, where doctrinal 
commentators and judges have embraced its reconciliation with commercial reality.222 
The leading decision of Berlei Hestia (NZ) Ltd. v. Fernyhough is illustrative of New 
Zealand support for the pragmatic view.223  The Berlei Hestia case involved a series of 
takeovers and mergers, culminating with an Australian company, Berlei Hestia, obtaining 
a 40% share interest in a New Zealand company, Bendon Berlie.  Accordingly, Bendon 
Berlie’s articles of association allowed for Berlei Hestia to nominate three of the six 
directors on Bendon Berlie’s board, while the remaining three directors were to be 
nominated by the New Zealand shareholders of Bendon Berlie.  However, a dispute arose 
from Bendon Berlie’s competition with Berlei Hestia’s business in Australia, leading to 
the breakdown of relations between the parties including between the nominee directors 
representing each side.  Namely, it was alleged by Berlei Hestia that the New Zealand 
shareholders’ nominee directors had taken control of Bendon Berlie’s affairs to the 
exclusion of Berlei Hestia’s nominee directors.  It was also alleged that the New Zealand 
shareholders’ nominees were refusing Berlei Hestia’s nominees access to Bendon 
Berlie’s premises and to corporate information that should ordinarily be accessible to all 
directors.  
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As such, Berlei Hestia applied for an interlocutory injunction against the New Zealand 
shareholder nominees to invalidate the approval of certain accounting statements given 
that they were approved without the consent of Berlei Hestia’s nominees.  Berlei Hestia 
also requested a court order forcing the New Zealand shareholders’ nominees to allow 
Berlei Hestia’s nominees access to board meetings, company records and other corporate 
information.  The New Zealand shareholders’ nominees argued that their conduct was 
justified given Berlei Hestia’s competition with Bendon Berlie.224  
Justice Mahon ultimately sided with Berlei Hestia, noting that irrespective of the fact that 
the directors were nominees of Berlei Hestia, they nonetheless had responsibilities to the 
whole body of shareholders and as such, their exclusion from governance was unjustified.  
Furthermore, Justice Mahon’s support of Justice Jacob’s pragmatic view was particularly 
evident in this decision where he made the following propositions in connection with the 
pragmatic view: 
“ […] there have been attempts to bring this theoretical doctrine of 
undivided responsibility into harmony with commercial reality, upon 
the basis that when articles [of association] are agreed upon whereby 
a specified shareholder or group of shareholders is empowered to 
nominate its own directors, then there may be grounds for saying that 
in addition to the responsibility which such directors have to all 
shareholders as represented by the corporate entity, they may have a 
special responsibility towards those who nominated them.”225 
Mahon indicated that according to the pragmatic view, construing a company’s articles so 
as to permit a director to attribute special consideration to one particular stakeholder 
could be conducive to the interests of the company as a whole.226  
While the majority of Canadian case law involving the conflict of interest faced by 
nominee directors evidences adherence to a less comprising view, at least one author has 
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suggested that the Canadian judiciary may be moving to a more moderate stance on this 
issue.227   
Interestingly, the province of Alberta also appears to provide endorsement for a more 
pragmatic view in the form of corporate legislation.  Namely, subsection 122(4) of the 
Alberta Business Corporations Act228 (the “Albert Act”), contains a unique provision 
that reads as follows: 
122 (4) In determining whether a particular transaction or course of 
action is in the best interests of the corporation, a director, if the 
director is elected or appointed by the holders of a class or series of 
shares or by employees or creditors or a class of employees or 
creditors, may give special, but not exclusive, consideration to the 
interests of those who elected or appointed the director. 
This seems to be the only existing legislation in Canada that explicitly recognizes the 
practice and position of nominee directors and allows such directors some leeway.  
Although somewhat vague, it appears that subsection 122(4) of the Alberta Act allows 
nominee directors to attribute special consideration to the interests of their appointers.  
Furthermore, legislative commentary leading up to the adoption of this provision seems 
to confirm such a position and may even suggest a possible inclination towards a 
modified standard of duty applicable to nominee directors: 
“If [a nominee director] is elected, the CBCA, and probably the 
present Alberta law, imposes upon him the same duty to advance the 
company’s interests as is imposed upon the other directors. It may 
well be argued that the director’s fiduciary duty prevents him from 
reporting to his constituency and from taking its interests into account, 
so that the purpose for which he is appointed is stultified. Our 
inclination is to adapt a suggestion made by Professor Gower in 
connection with another subject and to recommend that the proposed 
Act provide that […] a director ‘may give special but not exclusive 
consideration’ to the interests of the special constituency.”229 
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It appears that subsection 122(4) has been applied by the judiciary only in rare 
circumstances.  One such circumstance is the decision of Colborne Capital Corp. v. 
542775 Alberta Ltd., a case involving an appeal by a nominee director of a wholly-owned 
subsidiary.230  One of the nominee director’s grounds for appeal was that the trial judge 
had erred in holding that he owed a fiduciary duty to the parent company.  Although the 
appeal was ultimately allowed on other grounds, on this particular point, the appeal court 
concluded that the trial judge had not erred and relied on the former subsection 122(4) to 
conclude that the nominee was in a very particular position and did in fact owe a 
fiduciary duty to his appointer, in this case, the parent company.  However, the court did 
distinguish this case from Scottish Co-operative in that there were no minority 
shareholders.  
Decisions that have adhered to the pragmatic view acknowledge that the appointment of 
nominee directors onto corporate boards is common and accepted commercial practice. 
However, in contrast with the strict view, the pragmatic view expressly permits nominee 
directors to govern in the interests of their appointers.  The limitation appears to be that 
directors must reasonably believe that consideration or promotion of their appointers’ 
interest is not contrary to the interests of the company.231 However, where does one draw 
the line?  
Author Crutchfield proposes the following standard so as to determine whether a 
nominee director is off-side:  
“A nominee is entitled to have in mind the interests of his 
appointer, and to advance the interest of his appointer, provided 
that in so doing he has a reasonable belief that he is acting 
consistently with the interests of the company as a whole [...]”232  
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Crutchfield also notes that although such standard may be criticized for inciting disregard 
for the company’s interests, he contends that it is in line with Justice Jacobs’ objective 
standard put forth in Broadcasting Station.233    
Although many doctrinal commentators hale both the Levin and the Broadcasting Station 
cases for being in tune with commercial reality,234 it is uncertain whether they are validly 
accepted authority.  To this author’s knowledge, neither of these two decisions appears to 
have been explicitly confirmed for the exact same motives and Justice Jacobs reasoning 
in Broadcasting Station with respect to nominee directorship has even been questioned as 
regards to whether it constitutes validly accepted authority.235  
The Corporations and Market Advisory Committee has even suggested that Justice 
Street’s view in the Bennetts’ decision constitutes authority on the dual loyalty of 
nominee directors while Justice Jacob’s view is merely an obiter opinion.236 Others have 
contended that the pragmatic view does not adequately protect minority shareholders and 
that nominee directors should not be able to govern with their appointer’s interests in 
mind unless the company’s articles or a shareholder’s resolution expressly permits such 
conduct.237  
This leads to the final judicial approach to nominee directorship which is perhaps the 
most practically accepted approach, given the criticism of the other two approaches and 
the emphasis of this third approach on the intent of the parties.  
3.3 Looking to the corporations’ constituent documents 
The third and final approach to nominee directorship essentially reposes on an 
examination of the corporation’s articles and other related documentation, including 
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unanimous shareholders’ or joint venture agreements so as to determine whether the 
nominee director may benefit from an attenuated standard of duty.238 According to this 
view, the director’s dual loyalty may be tolerated by way of an agreement, subject of 
course to certain restrictions in connection with the alteration of a director’s duties.239 
This view essentially reposes on the premise that fiduciary obligations should not remain 
stagnant and may depend on a variety of characteristics such as the constitution and 
structure of the company or even the source of a nominee’s appointment.240 However, in 
such circumstances, it has been put forth that substantive evidence is required to 
demonstrate that a nominee director’s fiduciary duty has in fact been attenuated by way 
of an agreement, such as an express written agreement executed by all of the 
shareholders.241  
Although the Levin case is often associated with the pragmatic view, in this latter 
decision, the court also emphasized that the company’s constituent documents had 
narrowed the applicable fiduciary duties, allowing the nominee directors to act in the 
interests of their appointer.242 In this decision, the court appeared to favour the notion that 
directors’ fiduciary duties are not to remain static, and are subject to statutory 
modification pursuant to the wishes and desires of the parties; as per Jacobs: “the 
fiduciary duty has been narrowed, by agreement amongst the body of the 
shareholders.”243 Similarly, in the Berlei Hestia decision, the court also appeared to 
suggest the possibility that an attenuated form of fiduciary liability may be agreed upon 
by way of the company’s articles.244 
Utilizing the company’s constituent documents or unanimous shareholders’ agreement to 
determine the scope of a director’s duties was also determinative in several other 
decisions.245 By way of example, in Whitehouse v. Carlton246, the High Court of 
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Australia paid particular attention to the provisions of the company’s articles in analyzing 
whether the governing director had the right to allot shares to dilute the voting powers of 
the existing shareholders, so as to ensure that his sons, the appellants and shareholders, 
retained control over the company.  There was a particular provision in the company’s 
articles that vested the governing director, Mr. Whitehouse with extensive and exclusive 
powers as the sole governing director.  The court dismissed the appeal, insisting on the 
fact that the company’s articles did not allow for such an improper purpose.  Of interest 
however, is that the majority appeared to support the proposition that the company’s 
articles may validate an otherwise improper purpose.  In the courts words:  
“It may be assumed that the Articles of a company could be so framed 
that they conferred upon a governing director authority to exercise a 
power to allot shares for the purpose of diluting the voting power or 
other rights of existing shareholders. They have not been so framed in 
the present case. [The article in question] does not authorize the 
exercise by Mr. Whitehouse of that fiduciary power for what would be 
an impermissible and vitiating purpose if it were exercised by the 
directors.”247 
Another decision that endorsed a similar approach was Japan Abrasive Materials Pty Ltd. 
& Others v. Australian Fused Materials Pty Ltd.248 This decision involved a joint venture 
company in which each of the three shareholder companies were attributed with the right 
to appoint two directors onto the joint venture company’s board.  However, a dispute 
arose between the parties in relation to a proposed expansion.  Essentially, the joint 
venture company could not proceed with the proposed expansion unless it received the 
unanimous approval of all the directors at a board meeting.  Although, the nominee 
directors of one of the shareholders refused to approve the proposed expansion, the 
majority nonetheless decided to go through with the proposal.  This resulted in the 
dissenting shareholder’s institution of proceedings requesting a declaration that the 
proposed expansion had not received the necessary approval, as well as a permanent 
injunction restraining the company from implementing the expansion project.  The 
defendant shareholders argued that the nominee directors of the plaintiff were acting 
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exclusively in the interests of their appointers and were therefore in breach of their 
fiduciary duties to act in the best interests of the company. 
The Supreme Court of Western Australia, presided by Justice Templeman, ultimately 
ruled in favour of the plaintiff, being the dissenting shareholder.  The court noted that the 
shareholders’ agreement expressly permitted the nominee directors to vote in accordance 
with the wishes of their appointer.  Moreover, the court held that this position was not in 
conflict with the directors’ statutory duties.249  As such, there was no breach of the 
fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the company.  Particularly of interest was the 
court’s acceptance of the modification of the fiduciary duties by way of the shareholders’ 
agreement.  Justice Templeman, citing Levin v. Clark with approval, noted the following: 
“It is always open to shareholders by unanimous agreement, to 
attenuate the fiduciary duties which the directors of their company 
would otherwise owe to it. […] I [do not] see any conflict between the 
right of a nominee director to vote in accordance with the wishes of 
the appointing joint venturer and the fiduciary obligations imposed on 
him or her […]”250      
It is however important to note that the Japan Abrasive case involved a joint venture 
company.  Joint venture companies are quite particular in that their interests are more 
often aligned with those of their shareholders; as such it has been argued that the 
directors of joint venture companies benefit from a higher degree of immunity than 
directors of non-joint venture companies.251  
The New Zealand Companies Act (“N.Z. Act”) contains a provision that allows nominee 
directors of a joint venture company to act in the best interests of their appointers in 
circumstances where the company’s constituent documents explicitly allow the directors 
to act in such a manner.252  Author Crutchfield, who supports the view that an attenuation 
of the nominee director’s duties should be permitted in circumstances where the 
unanimous shareholders’ agreement or the company’s articles specifically provide for 
such an attenuation, proposes that a draft provision be inserted into the articles so as to 
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shield the nominee director from a breach of his duties in circumstances where such 
nominee acts in the interests of his appointer.253 Moreover, Crutchfield notes the 
advantages of inserting such a provision, such as, the fact that the scope of the nominee 
director’s duties are expressly defined, providing the court with guidance in situations 
where a dispute arises.  To the extent that the attenuation of the nominee director’s duties 
is permitted, such attenuation should be undertaken with the necessary consent.254  
However, the permissible scope of attenuation is questionable, particularly, in view of the 
fact that directors must never fetter their discretion by limiting the exercise of their future 
discretion.255  
Thus, despite the case law and doctrine in support of the possibility of attenuating the 
nominee director’s duties by providing a provision to this effect in the company’s articles 
or in other relevant agreements, there remains a risk that such attenuation may be 
invalidated.256 As per Justice Warren’s comments in the British Chancery Division 
decision of Cobden v. RWM:  
“[...] the duties are capable of being attenuated with the 
unanimous agreement of the shareholders, although I would 
remark that attenuation does not mean complete abrogation. The 
extent to which the shareholders could effectively agree that a 
particular nominee director could act in a way which, he and the 
rest of the board, saw to be positively against the interests of the 
company must be open to question.”257   
Interestingly, subsection 173(2)(b) of the U.K. Companies Act 2006258 (“U.K. Act.”) 
allows a director, in exercising independent judgment, to act “in a way authorised by the 
company’s constitution.” The legislative commentary leading up to the enactment of the 
U.K. Act indicates that the foregoing provision allows a nominee director to act in 
accordance with the wishes of his appointer without breaching his duty to exercise 
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independent judgement, provided that same is stipulated in the company’s constituent 
documents.259   
It has been contended that only one particular aspect of the fiduciary duty may be 
modified or even excluded by the company’s constituent documents, being the duty to act 
for a proper purpose.260 Accordingly, this duty may be excluded by way of the articles in 
view of the fact that the duty itself may be established by the articles rather than by way 
of general corporate law.261 In other words, a provision in the company’s articles may in 
fact determine what constitutes an improper or proper purpose.262 It has been suggested 
that in circumstances where the articles are drafted so as to attribute complete discretion 
to the directors, then all that is consequently required of them is to act honestly; and as 
such, the duty to act for a proper purpose may be excluded.263 However, this is not the 
unanimous approach, as Parkinson’s notes, “the proper-purpose doctrine exists therefore, 
to maintain the constitutional separation of powers within a company; an article which 
releases the duty would serve to undermine the corporate structure […]”264  
In circumstances where the law permits a nominee to act according to the wishes of his 
appointer, then a provision in the articles allowing him to so act shall most likely be 
upheld.  However, in circumstances where the director is subject to a strict fiduciary duty 
that may not be attenuated, a provision in the company’s articles that indirectly shields a 
nominee director from a breach of duty in circumstances where he acts in the interests of 
his appointer, may not be given any effect.265 
It is clear that while the attenuation of duty may be formulated so as to allow the nominee 
director to consider and promote the interests of his appointer, such attenuation would 
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never allow a nominee director to conduct himself in a manner that is oppressive to 
minority shareholders or detrimental to the company’s business.266 
Thus, one comes to the primordial question of this chapter: how to reconcile the different 
approaches to resolve the inherent conflict faced by nominee directors?  
3.4 Chapter summary and the possible reconciliation of the different views  
Each of the three approaches has received both judicial and doctrinal support and 
criticism, rendering it impossible to ascertain the prevailing approach.  However, several 
common denominators may be identified amongst all of them.  Other than adherence to 
the strict view in its purest form, it is safe to conclude that all three approaches, whether 
implicitly or explicitly, recognize the practice of appointing nominee directors.267  
While the dual loyalty has consequently been acknowledged by the judiciary; it is the 
conflict of this dual loyalty that causes the primary difficulty.  However, it appears that so 
long as there is no conflict between the interests of the appointer and those of the 
company, from a practical perspective, it is unlikely that the nominee director shall face 
liability.  Thus, whether nominee directors can promote the interests of their appointer 
where such interests either coincide with, or are not contrary to, the company’s best 
interests, is for the most part academic. On the other hand, under all circumstances, in 
situations of actual conflict, a nominee director can never prefer the interests of his 
appointer to those of the company.268  
 According to author Ayeung, the pragmatic view and the strict view may ultimately “be 
a distinction without a difference and furthermore accord with the strong general 
principle requiring directors to act ‘bona fide’ in the company’s best interests.”269  
As such, it is unclear whether the three different approaches represent a different 
application of legal principle or whether ultimately the same legal principal is being 
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applied to different facts.270 By way of example, in cases illustrative of the strict view 
such as in Scottish Co-operative, there was a clear intent on the part of the nominee 
directors and their appointers to act in bad faith and in a manner that is contrary to the 
best interests of the company.  In other cases illustrative of the pragmatic view, such as in 
the Levin or Broadcasting Station decisions, such an intent was not evident.  Thus, 
perhaps conflicts of interests faced by nominee directors that lead to situations of 
litigation, as was illustrative in the cases that were examined throughout this chapter, 
must be approached on a case-by-case basis.  If evidence is illustrative of bad faith or an 
intent to act blindly in accordance with an appointer’s wishes, whether or not such wishes 
are concurrent with the company’s best interests, then the courts will mostly likely adhere 
to a less compromising approach.  By way of example, in Glopal v. Burke, the Supreme 
Court of British Columbia agreed with the Scottish Co-operative decision given the fact 
pattern similarity with the case before it.271   
This also seems to be in line with Justice Warren’s view in Cobden v. RWM272, in which 
he states that as a generality, the extent of the duties of a nominee director are fact-
specific:  
“The general duty is clear; the difficult question is the extent to 
which the duty is qualified. That qualification will depend 
critically on the context of the relationship and the particular 
action which is said to constitute a breach of duty.”273    
As such, in circumstances where there is no evidence of bad faith in the alleged conduct 
and that such conduct could be attributed to reasonable commercial or business strategy, 
then perhaps courts will be inclined to take on a more pragmatic stance, particularly in 
circumstances where the articles, a shareholders’ agreement or a joint venture agreement 
allow for directors to consider the interests of their appointers.  After all, further to the 
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Supreme Court of Canada, persons are presumed to be acting in good faith unless proven 
otherwise.274  
However, if the nominee director subordinates the interests of the company to those of 
his appointer in situations of actual conflict, the nominee is clearly in breach of his 
fiduciary duties.  Although several cases in Section 3.3 above do suggest that the 
fiduciary duty owed by a nominee director may be attenuated, the limits of such 
attenuation remain unclear.  While in certain jurisdictions, the attenuation of the fiduciary 
duty may be permitted, in Canada such attenuation has been expressly barred by the 
judiciary.275   
As such, on the basis of either approach, in circumstances of veritable conflict between 
the company’s interests and those of an appointer, the nominee director must always 
prefer the interests of the company irrespective of whether this may result in such 
director’s forced resignation or termination.276 As noted by authors Nicholl and Paskell-
Mede: “the nominee who cannot stand the heat ought to get out of the kitchen.”277 Hence, 
while the appropriate course of action may not necessarily always be resignation, under 
certain circumstances, it may be the only course open.278  
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4. COMMON DIFFICULTIES ASSOCIATED WITH NOMINEE 
DIRECTORSHIP  
While the preceding chapter dealt mainly with the different judicial approaches 
formulated to resolve the inherent conflict of dual loyalty, this chapter explores in more 
detail the most common and practical difficulties associated with nominee directorship as 
well as the legislative and judicial responses to these difficulties.  The first of these 
associated difficulties is arguably the most important, given that it often constitutes the 
raison d’être of the nominee’s appointment.  
4.1 Access and disclosure to corporate information  
As mandataries and fiduciaries of a corporation, directors must have access to all 
corporate information required to fulfill their mandate and their duties as directors.279  
However, as part of their fiduciary duties, directors are required to preserve the 
confidentiality of information received through their position.280  As such, directors are 
precluded from disclosing or using corporate information, whether for their personal 
benefit, for the benefit of any third party, or to the detriment of the company.281 
Furthermore, the fiduciary duty also prohibits directors from competing with the 
company; and as such they are precluded from appropriating any corporate opportunities 
and assets that belong to the company.282 Article 323 of the C.C.Q. has codified an 
equivalent to this common law rule, under which, absent authorization, it explicitly 
prohibits a director from using for his own profit or for the profit of a third person, any 
property of the corporation.283 Corporate information acquired through, or a result of the 
director’s position constitutes property belonging to the company and is therefore 
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covered by the foregoing prohibition, independent of whether such information is 
necessarily characterized as confidential.284  
However, reporting back corporate information to an appointer is undoubtedly one of the 
principle motives behind the appointment of a nominee director.285  By way of example, a 
nominee director representing a financial lender or other important creditor shall 
undoubtedly be expected to report back relevant information to his appointer.286  After 
all, it is only normal that a financial lender or creditor desires to “keep an eye out” on its 
stakes; usually by way of monitoring the corporate affairs and board discussions through 
one or two nominee directors.287 In absence of such supervision, a financial lender may 
abstain from advancing the necessary funds to the company for lack of confidence.  Same 
can be reasoned in situations where the company is seeking an extension to make a loan 
payment, or where the company requires additional credit.  In such circumstances, a 
nominee director representing an important creditor may provide the latter with the 
needed comfort to advance the required funds.288  However, if an impending insolvency 
is revealed, a nominee director’s reporting back may result in a creditor’s decision not to 
invest or worse, to “pull the plug”.  As noted by author Leigh Thomson, a nominee 
director representing a debenture holder shall likely provide his appointer with details of 
a corporation’s breach of the debenture and/or whether there are grounds for an 
appointer’s intervention.289 
While the actual agreement between a nominee and his appointer shall differ on a case-
by-case basis, the nominee is likely required to inform his appointer on matters that 
present particular importance.290  However, channelling corporate information back to 
one’s appointer, whether confidential information or not, places the nominee director in a 
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compromising situation, particularly in circumstances where disclosure of such 
information could injure the company.291  
Furthermore, the situation is equally difficult in opposing situations where the nominee 
acquires information from his appointer that could adversely affect the company.  Thus, 
to what extent, if any, may a nominee director access confidential corporate information 
and subsequently disclose said information back to his appointer? Additionally, if a 
nominee acquires important information from his appointer that could harm the company, 
is a nominee obliged to report back to the latter?  The following subsections attempt to 
respond to the foregoing questions.  
4.1.1 Nominee directors’ access to corporate information 
All directors have a general right to attend board meetings and access corporate records 
and information.292 This right of access is derived under both statute and under the 
common law.  By way of example, Sections 20, 21 and 110 of the CBCA explicitly allow 
directors the right to consult corporate information and attend board meetings.  These 
rights have been interpreted to allow directors broad access to all of the corporate 
information and records required to properly perform their duties and functions.293 
Moreover, it appears that access to corporate information must always be granted unless 
it can be evidenced that a director shall misuse such information.294  
This general rule applies without distinction to nominee directors.295 As fiduciaries of the 
company, nominee directors have an equal right of access to corporate information.296 as 
has been held in several foreign decisions. By way of example, in the New Zealand 
decision of Berlei Hestia, the facts of which have already been reiterated above,297 it was 
held that nominee directors, like any other directors, should not be denied access to 
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corporate information unless it is evidenced that they would misuse such information.298  
As such, in absence of concrete evidence suggesting that the nominee directors were 
going to misuse the corporate information they needed to access, the court concluded that 
they should have been granted access.299  Furthermore, the court held that the only 
evidence brought to its attention was the fact that the directors were nominees, and that 
this alone was not sufficient to deny them access to corporate information.300 
In the subsequent New Zealand decision of Trounce and Wakefield v. NCF Kaiopoi Ltd., 
similar reasoning was invoked.301 This case involved an application for a prohibition 
against a company and seven of its directors from creating a sub-committee, to evaluate a 
takeover offer, on the grounds that it purposefully excluded the applicants, being two of 
the board’s nominee directors.  The defendants argued that the nominee directors would 
undoubtedly report all information back to their appointers and, as such, they were in an 
inherent position of conflict, justifying their exclusion from the sub-committee.  The New 
Zealand High Court rejected the defendants’ pretensions and reiterated the premise that 
nominee directors, like any other directors, must be granted the right to access all 
corporate information, to attend all board meetings and to actively participate in the 
affairs of the company.  
In Trounce v. NCF, the court relied on landmark decisions such as Edman v. Ross in 
which it was held that a director’s right to inspect corporate documents is imperative to 
the proper performance of a director’s duties, and that unless there is evidence of abuse or 
bad faith, a court should not have any discretionary powers in determining whether a 
director can or cannot access such information.302  
It was concurrently noted by the court in Trounce v. NCF, that a director’s right of access 
is necessary to properly discharging his duties and that there should not be a presumption 
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that a nominee director would conduct himself in bad faith merely because of his position 
of dual loyalty:  
“[The nominee directors] will have to be acutely aware of their 
fiduciary obligations should the interests of the company as resolved 
by the directors run counter to the interests of the company that has 
appointed them. I am certain that directors as persons of integrity are 
capable of exercising the nice decisions that are required to be made 
in these circumstances and it is plain that directors are required to do 
this in many circumstances from time to time. I am not prepared to 
impute bad faith to them in advance and I believe the company must 
take its directorate as it is structured.”303  
The court also cited with approval the Broadcasting Station decision and reiterated that 
absent evidence to the contrary, nominee directors should be presumed to be acting in 
good faith and in line with their fiduciary duties.  
Similarly, in the Australian decision of Molomby v. Whitehead, rendered less than a year 
prior to the Trounce v. NCF decision, the applicant, a nominee director, was denied 
access to documentation relating to claims for legal fees despite the fact that such 
documentation was made available to the other board members. 304  The Federal Court of 
Australia ultimately concluded that there was no evidence to the effect that the applicant 
nominee director would misuse the information and thus, there was no justification in 
denying the nominee director access to information and documentation that was made 
readily available to the other board members. 
However, in circumstances where there is conflict of interest; a court will not hesitate to 
highlight a nominee director’s obligation to preserve the confidentiality of information 
received through his position.305 Accordingly, where it is demonstrated that a nominee 
director will misuse the corporate information that he seeks to access, including 
unauthorized disclosure, the courts will likely deny such access.306  Again, the primordial 
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factor must be that the nominee director shall misuse or disclose such information despite 
board instructions to keep the information confidential.307  
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Canadian courts generally appear to favour broad access 
to corporate information. By way of example, in 152581 Canada Ltd. v. Matol World 
Corp., the Québec Superior Court held that preventing or limiting access to corporate 
information cannot be reconciled with the position of a corporate director and therefore 
access to corporate information cannot be easily denied.308  
As such, it is safe to conclude that nominee directors, like all other corporate directors, 
have a generally unrestricted right of access to all corporate information required so as to 
discharge their duties. Such access is particularly important given that as part of their 
duty of care, all directors, including nominee directors, are required to be reasonably 
informed prior to exercising their decision-making powers.309  
Thus, as a general statement, a director’s right of access, whether an independent director 
or a nominee, cannot be limited, unless a director’s intent to misuse the corporate 
information that he seeks to access is evidenced.310 Perhaps, the aforementioned 
statement was best expressed in Morgan v. 45 Fleurs, where the Supreme Court of New 
South Wales concluded the following: 
“A board member can look at all the papers that he wants to see, even 
though he may be appointed to represent a special interest group 
because when acting for the board it is assumed unless the contrary is 
proved the director is acting in the affairs of the board and not in 
conflict with them.”311  
Thus, while the principles with respect to a nominee director’s access to corporate 
information are relatively clear, the same cannot be said as to whether such information 
may be disclosed to an appointer.  Corporate information obtained by a director may only 
be used for the purposes for which such information was accessed; thus, to what extent, if 
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any, may a nominee director disclose corporate information to his appointer? It appears 
that the favoured approach to the regulation of nominee directors and their duties with 
respect to corporate information targets disclosure of corporate information rather than 
the right to obtain such information.312   
4.1.2  Nominee directors’ disclosure of corporate information  
As noted above, it is clear legal principal that all directors may not use information 
obtained as a result of, or through their positions, whether confidential or not, for their 
personal benefit or for the benefit of any third party.313 However, will the disclosure of 
confidential corporate information by a nominee director necessarily incur the latter’s 
liability?   
Interestingly, in at least one Canadian decision, the Alberta Court of Appeal held that, 
absent any conflict of interest, directors of a subsidiary company are not precluded from 
providing their parent company with confidential corporate information and that any 
strict rule precluding such disclosure would be both impractical and difficult to 
enforce.314 
It is evident that directors who agree to pass on all company information to their 
appointer would be in breach of their fiduciary duties, particularly the duty not to fetter 
their discretion.315  Additionally, where company information may result in, or contribute 
to, a conflicting situation between the company and the appointer, again directors are 
precluded from disclosing such information.316  
Furthermore, it has been put forth that the duty of confidence, existing in parallel with the 
fiduciary duties, would also preclude directors from disclosing any confidential corporate 
information without the company’s prior consent.317 In order for corporate information to 
be deemed confidential, such information must have a quality of confidence and must not 
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be information which is public property or public knowledge.318 Public information 
mixed with private information to produce a final body of information may be deemed 
confidential.319 As such, board meeting deliberations are generally also characterized as 
confidential.320  However, in circumstances where corporate information is not deemed 
confidential and generally accessible, it is unlikely that a nominee’s disclosure of such 
information will give rise to any legal consequences.   
According to the Supreme Court of Canada in the seminal decision of Lac Minerals v. 
International Corona Resources, in circumstances where: (i) the information is deemed 
confidential; (ii) is communicated in confidence; and (iii) is misused by the party to 
whom it was communicated, then the duty of confidence has been breached.321 
The fact that the Supreme Court appears to require an element of “misuse” so as to infer a 
breach of the duty of confidence may evidence that the breach of the duty of confidence 
is subject to a liability rule as opposed to a property rule.  Liability and property rules 
were first theorized in great detail by authors Calabresi and Melamed, as potential 
mechanisms to protect and balance various legal rights in the face of conflict.322 
According to Calabresi and Melamed’s theory, the consequences of a breach shall depend 
on whether the right is protected by the property rule as opposed to the liability rule.323 If 
the right is subject to a property rule, the mere use of such right results in a breach.324 
Hence, subject to the property rule, the nominee director’s disclosure of corporate 
information back to his appointer, regardless of whether his appointer acts on such 
information, is a breach that subjects the nominee to liability.  However, if the right is 
subject to the liability rule, the nominee’s disclosure is not in and of itself a breach that 
shall incur liability; rather the breach will necessary require evidence of damages.  
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Moreover, under the liability rule, the remedies in the face of a breach are limited to 
compensatory damages.325  
One doctrinal commentator that has contemplated this issue from a theoretical 
perspective contends that the breach of confidentiality, particularly in the context of a 
fiduciary relationship, should be subject to the property rule as opposed to the liability 
rule.326  However, although confidential corporate information gives rise to ownership 
rights, particularly in the corporate context, it has also been put forth that it would be 
quite challenging and inefficient to subject the breach of such rights, whether by 
unauthorized disclosure or otherwise, to the property rule as elaborated by Calabresi and 
Melamed.327 Furthermore, the misuse by a director, of a company’s assets, which 
includes information,328 will often go undetected unless such misuse results in 
damages.329 As noted by author and professor Loke:   
“The liability rule is distinguishable by the fact that the taking is 
possible notwithstanding its unlawful nature. [...] The fiduciary who 
uses corporate information might be liable to account for the profits 
made with the corporate information - he is penalized with restitution 
remedies. But his capacity to appropriate a corporate opportunity or 
use corporate information without the consent of the corporation 
persists. [...] That the fiduciary has the leeway to appropriate the 
corporate information or the corporate opportunity – notwithstanding 
such appropriation being unlawful – undermines the essential 
requirement of consent which identifies protection of an entitlement by 
the property rule.”330 
 
This issue does not appear to have been the subject of any doctrinal commentary in either 
Australia or New Zealand.  However, given that breach of the duty of confidence appears 
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to necessarily require evidence of misuse,331 one may contend that in the latter 
jurisdictions, subjecting the breach of confidentiality to the liability rule may be the 
favoured approach.  Absent evidence of misuse, Australian and New Zealand courts 
appear reluctant to grant any remedies, whether compensatory or otherwise, so as to 
prevent access or disclosure of confidential information.332  
At least one Canadian decision appears to endorse a similar approach; in Aronowicz v. 
Emtwo Properties Inc., the Ontario Superior Court of Justice refused to grant any 
remedies as a result of a shareholder-director’s disclosure of confidential corporate 
information, in absence of any evidence of harm or detriment to the corporation.333  
4.1.3 Possibility of disclosure without breach? 
It has been contended by several doctrinal commentators that the disclosure of corporate 
information, whether confidential or not, may be permitted by express or even implied 
contractual consent.334 As noted in the third chapter, if the view that a company’s articles 
may reformulate a nominee director’s fiduciary duties is accepted, then this same logic 
could apply to whether a nominee director may report information back to his appointer; 
namely an express provision contained in the company’s articles could allow nominee 
directors to disclose corporate information to their appointers.335 However, the insertion 
of such a provision risks contravening a director’s duty not to fetter his future discretion. 
Moreover, in jurisdictions such as Canada, the interdiction against the attenuation of 
directors’ duties by agreement would likely bar the viability of such a solution.336   
Absent consent or contractual provisions that either expressly or implicitly allow 
disclosure, nominee directors who disclose confidential information back to their 
appointers are theoretically in breach of their duties.337 However, from a practical 
                                               
331
 Discussion paper No. 7, 1987, supra note 16 at para. 328-329.  
332
 See e.g. Berlei Hestia, supra note 222; Ford et al., supra note 23 at para. 10.410. 
333
 Aronowicz v. Emtwo Properties Inc., [2009] CanLII 55454 at para. 63 (ON S.C.D.C.) (QL) [Aronowicz v. Emtwo 
Properties].  
334
 Corporate Groups (Final Report), supra note 28 at para. 2.118; Redmond, supra note 22 at 33. 
335
 Ibid.  
336
 Rousseau & Gauthier, supra note  36 at 16, 27. 
337
 Ibid. 
 71 
perspective, the risk of injuring the company and/or incurring liability may be 
insignificant, depending on the circumstances.  
Institutional and other large investors often require, as a condition to advancing the 
necessary funds to a corporation, that in addition to board representation, they are also 
provided with broad and periodic access to corporate information that may otherwise be 
deemed confidential, including sensitive financial information in connection with the 
corporation. Thus, in circumstances where a creditor is permitted access to such 
information pursuant to an agreement with the corporation, or as a condition to making 
an investment, a director’s disclosure of such information shall unlikely incur any 
practical legal consequences, unless the director discloses confidential information 
beyond his appointer’s realm of access.  Furthermore, given that such information may 
serve to comfort a creditor or investor, it can be argued that the disclosure of same is in 
fact in the interests of the company.338 However, the validity of a general authorization 
that allows a nominee director to continuously disclose confidential information to his 
appointer is problematic given that this may attenuate the director’s duties.339  
Moreover, in practice, in most circumstances, it is not the nominee director’s disclosure 
of confidential information back to his appointer that will incur legal consequences; but 
rather, it is the appointer’s conduct as a result of being provided with such information.  
If an appointer does not act on the information, the practical consequences of the 
nominee director’s conduct, in having disclosed the information, shall likely be 
minimal.340 It may be submitted that only in circumstances where an appointer acts on the 
information obtained, shall the nominee director realistically face liability.  Moreover, 
even in circumstances where an appointer acts on the information obtained, short of the 
appointer’s conduct harming the company, it is unlikely that the nominee would be 
subject to liability.  Conversely, in circumstances were the appointer’s conduct injures the 
company, the nominee will likely be held liable for any damages resulting from the 
appointer’s conduct.    
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In view of the foregoing, several jurisdictions have either proposed or enacted possible 
solutions to this predicament faced by nominee directors, namely the extent to which a 
director may report back to his appointer.  
By way of example, over two decades ago, the United Kingdom’s Institute of Directors 
had put forth a proposition suggesting that the appropriate test should simply be whether 
such disclosure was in the best interests of the company:  
“The simple criterion is whether the disclosure is bona fide in the 
interests of the company. It is for the director concerned to prove that 
any disclosure is indeed bona fide. A director cannot be acting bona 
fide in the interests of his company if he fetters his discretion as to 
how he is to act. Thus if a nominee director agreed always to pass on 
to his nominator the management accounts of the company of which 
he is a director, that action alone would be a breach of his duty to act 
in good faith towards that company.”341 
While the foregoing test is theoretically correct, in practice, nominee directors will 
unlikely comply, particularly in circumstances where they have been appointed by an 
important stakeholder who requires that certain information be necessarily reported back, 
whether or not, such disclosure is in the bona fide interests of the company.   
Another more viable solution lies in New Zealand corporate legislation, which contains a 
statutory exception allowing nominee directors to pass on corporate information to their 
appointers subject to the fulfillment of certain conditions contained in the legislation. 
Specifically, Section 145 of the N.Z. Act reads as follows [emphasis added]: 
145(1) A director of a company who has information in his or her capacity as a 
director or employee of the company, being information that would not otherwise 
be available to him or her, must not disclose that information to any person, or 
make use of or act on the information, except -  
(a)  for the purpose of the company; or 
(b)  as required by law; or 
(c)  in accordance with subsection (2) or subsection (3) of this section. 
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“145(2) A director of a company may, unless prohibited by the board, disclose 
information to   
(a)  a person whose interests the director represents; or 
(b)  a person in accordance with whose directions or instructions the 
director may be required or is accustomed to act in relation to the 
director’s powers and duties and, if the director discloses the 
information, the name of the person to whom it is disclosed must be 
entered in the interests register.” 
“145(3) A director of a company may disclose, make use of, or act on the 
information if - 
(a)  particulars of the disclosure, use, or the act in question are entered 
in the interests register; and 
(b)  the director is first authorized to do so by the board; and 
(c)  the disclosure, use, or act in question will not, or will not be likely 
to, prejudice the company.” 
Accordingly, subsection 145(2) allows a nominee director to effectively report back 
corporate information to his appointer unless the former is explicitly prohibited by the 
board to disclose such information.342  Furthermore, although the third subsection of this 
same section enlists conditions to the disclosure of information, these conditions do not 
appear to be cumulative given that subsection 145(1) refers to the conditions in either 
subsection (2) or subsection (3).  
Absent the enactment of a provision similar to the one contained in the N.Z. Act,343 each 
time a nominee director is party to confidential corporate information, it appears that the 
nominee must necessarily obtain the consent of the board prior to reporting back to his 
appointer.     
Consequently, absent consent of the board, the nominee must reflect on the consequences 
of reporting such corporate information back to his appointer given that reporting back 
will necessary result in a theoretical breach of the nominee director’s duties.  However, if 
reporting back to one’s appointer will unlikely harm the company, it is submitted that the 
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practical consequences of reporting back are minimal.  Conversely, if the consequences 
of reporting back to the appointer risks harming the company, then the nominee’s liability 
may be in play. By way of example, if the nominee is privy to confidential corporate 
information of a company’s possible insolvency and is expected to report such 
information back to his appointer, the nominee must evaluate his appointer’s reaction 
when advised of such information.  In circumstances where the appointer’s reaction may 
result in conduct that is harmful to the company, the nominee should either abstain from 
reporting back to his appointer or resign.   
4.1.4 Duty to report back to the company?  
Another connected issue that arises is the nominee director’s duty to report back 
information received from his appointer, particularly if such information may impact the 
company.  As noted by author McGuiness, “under general principles of equity, as 
fiduciaries, directors and officers are under a duty to their corporation to bring to its 
notice all information that comes to their attention that is relevant to its business or 
affaires.”344 The duty to report back to the company also ties in with a director’s duty not 
to compete with the company and to exploit all corporate opportunities, including 
information, for the benefit of the company.345  
The failure of nominee directors to disclose relevant information back to the company 
that they had been appointed to govern was at the heart of the dispute in the PWA 
decision, the facts of which have already been summarized above.346 In particular, at the 
trial level, it was concluded that the failure to disclose information back to the company 
was a breach of duty.347  However, the Court of Appeal limited the nominee director’s 
duty to report back to the company, to the information which affected the entity in a 
“vital aspect of its business”.348 
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Subsequently, in the Levy-Russel Ltd. decision the court cited with approval the Court of 
Appeal decision in PWA, and reiterated the premise that directors’ are required to 
disclose all information that was critical to the company.349 Other Canadian decisions 
have also rendered similar conclusions in emphasizing that directors must provide full 
and timely disclosure of information in connection with serious matters that affect the 
corporation.350  
In view of the nominee director’s positive obligation to report corporate information back 
to the company in circumstances where such information is material to the company’s 
operations, the nominee director may find himself in a compromising position 
particularly where his appointer has forbade him from disclosing such information.  In 
such circumstances, similar to when a nominee is privy to confidential corporate 
information that he has been forbidden to disclose to his appointer, it is submitted that the 
nominee director must make a decision to either report the information back to the 
company and face the consequences from his appointer or resign as a director of the 
corporation.   
Access, disclosure and the positive obligation to report back information are merely a few 
of the difficulties associated with nominee directorship.  Another major issue is the 
nominee director’s appointment to corporate boards within the corporate group structure. 
4.2 Nominee directors in corporate groups  
As noted in the second chapter, the modern day economy, particularly in the Canadian 
context, is no longer uniquely characterized by the single corporate entity, but rather, it 
consists of groups of integrated companies, often operating together as a whole and with 
common objectives.351 However, traditional legal principle requires that each company 
within the group be treated by its directors as a separate legal entity.352 As such, the 
doctrine of limited liability, fiduciary duties and the business judgment rule all 
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theoretically apply to subsidiary companies within corporate groups353 notwithstanding 
that their application is difficult in the context of corporate groups.  
Directors’ duties are particularly important in the corporate group context in view of the 
fact that legal principles require directors to discharge their duties in the interests of the 
individual company they have been appointed to govern as opposed to the group.354  In 
theory, these principles continue to prevail, even within group companies.355 However, in 
practice, directors on the board of a subsidiary company are increasingly nominees of the 
parent.356 As such, they are evidently expected, if not mandated, to govern in the interests 
of the parent.357 As author Lee notes, “it is unrealistic to insist that the interests of an 
entity which is part of a larger group can be completely isolated and divorced from the 
rest of the group, disregarding the fact of their interdependence.”358 Furthermore, 
subsidiaries are often created for practical reasons to further the objectives of the parent; 
in such circumstances, these subsidiaries seldom benefit from a distinct existence.359  
Consequently, the directors’ ability to veritably operate the subsidiary as a “truly 
independent” entity is often quite restricted.360 As noted by author Hadden, “[t]he 
traditional rules on the duties of the directors and officers of individual companies make 
little sense within corporate groups.”361  
It has been contented that the law surrounding directors’ duties within corporate groups 
severely lags commercial reality.362 While doctrinal commentators have focused on 
particular aspects of corporate groups, such as the allocation of liability, the possibility of 
piercing the corporate veil or the duties of directors’ in the particular context of 
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insolvency,363 few commentators have focused on the every-day tension faced by 
nominee directors governing within corporate group structures.  In such circumstances, 
nominee directors have a dual role; on one hand they must govern in the interests of their 
appointer which will likely concord with the best interests of the parent or the corporate 
group as a whole, and on the other hand, they must govern in the best interests of the 
company on whose board they sit.364 However, from a practical perspective, directors of 
companies within the group, particularly subsidiary companies, will govern according to 
the instruction of the parent.365 
Fortunately, it appears that the conduct of nominee directors appointed to the boards of 
companies within corporate groups rarely gives rise to conflict.  Perhaps this is because 
the long term interests of each company within the group are often intrinsically linked 
with the success of the corporate group as a whole.  Therefore, the interests of each of the 
companies within the group rarely diverge, particularly if the group is financially stable.  
However, in certain circumstances, such as when there arises a difference of opinion 
between the directors of the different companies within the group, including between 
those of a parent and subsidiary, or in situations of insolvency, conflict may surface.366 
Moreover, parent and subsidiary companies may engage in questionable price 
transferring practices that are often not in the best interests of the subsidiary; which may 
eventually result in conflict.367    
In light of the parent company’s power to remove the directors of each subsidiary, in 
practice, subsidiary directors shall rarely defend what they believe is the appropriate 
course of action and in the best interests of the company that they have been appointed to 
govern.  As such, they are essentially precluded from ever exercising true independence 
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in the corporate group context.368 This is a particularly preoccupying issue in 
circumstances where the subsidiary is partly-owned, and therefore includes minority 
shareholders and creditors or when the subsidiary or the group is in a financially 
precarious situation. As noted in the Australian decision of Re Spargos Mining NL: 
“One can understand that philosophy within a group of corporate 
entities where there is a unity of control in the form of major 
shareholdings and representation upon the various boards, but it is an 
approach which tends to take little account of the particular interests 
of individual companies and therefore of individual small 
shareholders in those corporate entities.”369 
The court ultimately held that the conduct of the nominee directors was not in the benefit 
of the company they were appointed to govern and consequently allowed an application 
for an oppression remedy.370 
In view of the predicament faced by directors nominated to the boards of companies 
within corporate groups; the judiciary, particularly in Australia, New Zealand and 
England has adopted several approaches in responding to alleged breaches of directors’ 
duties in the corporate group context.    
Earlier case law, particularly in Australia, preferred an application of what is referred to 
as the “entity approach”, derived from the theory that corporations forming part of a 
corporate group are to be treated as distinct legal entities, separate from the other 
companies within the group. This approach however, must be contrasted with a different 
line of authority that has endorsed what is referred to as the “enterprise approach”.371 
Pursuant to the enterprise approach, the focus should be on the business enterprise as a 
whole, and not on each individual company within the group.372 As such, the enterprise 
approach takes into consideration that directors’ appointed to the boards of different 
companies within a corporate group will likely govern in the interests of the group as a 
whole.   
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 A third approach was even suggested, evidenced in several decisions involving an 
alleged breach of directors’ duties in the corporate group context.373 This third approach 
appears to endorse a proper purpose test as a means of determining whether directors’ in 
the context of corporate groups have violated their fiduciary duties.  
The following sections provide an overview of each of these three approaches; they 
accordingly provide some insight on the manner in which directors appointed to the 
various boards within corporate groups should conduct themselves. 
4.2.1 The entity approach 
The traditional and arguably most conservative view with respect to directors’ duties in 
corporate groups, 374 being the entity approach, was expressed in the Australian decision 
of Walker v. Wimborne,375 in which the court took a hard line stance against the 
possibility of directors governing in consideration of the best interests of the group rather 
than the individual corporation they have been appointed to govern.376  
In Walker v. Wimborne, the directors of a company, operating as part of a group of 
companies, authorized and effected a series of intra-group transactions. One of these 
intra-group transactions involved loan payments to another company within the group 
that was in dire need of financial assistance.  However, the lending company did not 
receive any reciprocal benefits from the deal but for an implied promise of repayment 
upon demand.  The lending company subsequently went into liquidation; the liquidators 
challenged the validity of the aforementioned loan payments, on the grounds that the 
directors of the lending company had breached their fiduciary duty in authorizing the 
loan.  Essentially, the liquidators alleged that the loan payments were not made in the 
bona fide interest of the lending company and therefore constituted a misapplication of its 
funds.377 The High Court of Australia sided with the liquidators and concluded that the 
directors were wrong in having authorized most of the loan payments in view of the fact 
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that they did not benefit the lending company.  As regards the duties of the directors, the 
court stipulated the following: 
“Each of the companies was a separate and independent legal entity, 
and that it was the duty of the directors of [the lending company] to 
consult its interests and its interests alone in deciding whether the 
payments should be made to other companies.”378 
According to the approach as formulated in the Walker v. Wimborne decision, directors 
must govern in the interests of the specific company they have been appointed to direct 
and not in the interests of the group as a whole.379 Although the court did indicated that 
the interests of the group could be relevant in determining the interests of the lending 
company, author Baxt comments as follows:  
“[the Walker decision] denied directors in a group of companies 
the luxury of taking the interests of the group into account in 
evaluating a course of conduct, and this was particularly relevant 
where the relevant company or companies were insolvent.”380  
Although the single entity approach may provide certain benefits, such as the protection 
of unsecured creditors of solvent companies within a group or minority shareholders of 
partly-owned subsidiaries, it has been contended that such benefits may be overvalued.381  
However, doctrine and case law, particularly in Australia, indicate that Walker v. 
Wimborne remains authoritative legal principle.382 In Canada, although there is minimal 
case law on this precise issue, the premise in Walker v. Wimborne, that the individual 
members of group companies are distinct from each other was confirmed in at least one 
decision emanating from the Alberta Court of Appeal.383  
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In contrast with the entity approach is the enterprise approach, which is arguably a more 
liberal approach, in that it allows directors to govern in the interests of the group as a 
whole, provided that in so doing, they are also objectively advancing the interests of the 
company on whose board they have been appointed to govern.384  
4.2.2 The enterprise approach 
The enterprise approach allows the corporate group to be treated as a single economic 
enterprise that functions as a whole.  According to the enterprise approach, the corporate 
group may adopt governing principals that allow the controlling or parent company 
within the group to operate the companies within its control for the benefit of the 
corporate group as a whole. Moreover, the directors of each company within the 
corporate group may owe their primary allegiance to the controlling or parent company 
or even to the corporate group as a whole, rather than to the individual company they 
have been appointed to govern.385 Additionally, it has also been submitted that the 
enterprise approach to corporate governance may even provide a solution to the 
associated difficulties faced by corporate groups in the context of insolvency.386  
The British decision of Charterbridge Corporations Ltd. v. Lloyds Bank Ltd.387 is often 
accredited as being the key case endorsing an enterprise-inspired approach to directors’ 
duties within corporate groups.388 In this latter decision, the court appeared to recognize 
that commercial reality dictates that directors within corporate groups shall necessarily 
act with a view to advancing the corporate group’s interests as a whole.389  
The Charterbridge case essentially involved a large group of companies, interrelated by 
both common shareholding and directorate.  The corporate group also shared the same 
objective, being the operation of a property development enterprise.  For practical 
reasons, a separate company was created for the purposes of dealing with each new 
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property that was acquired.  The series of events that gave rise to the litigious dispute 
appear to have stemmed from an overdraft from the accounts of several companies within 
the corporate group resulting in the bank’s request for additional guarantees.  A response 
to the bank’s request resulted in a string of interrelated guarantees by various companies 
within the corporate group.  Particularly, one of the companies, Pomeroy Developments 
(Castleford) Ltd. guaranteed the payments on demand owed by another company within 
the group, Pomeroy Developments Ltd.  Furthermore, Pomeroy Developments 
(Castleford) granted a security so as to finance the debts incurred by the financially 
troubled Pomeroy Developments.  
Subsequently, Pomeroy Developments (Castleford) entered into several agreements for 
the sale of its property; however the property could not be sold free and clear from 
encumbrances as a result of the security granted in exchange for the financial assistance 
to Pomeroy Developments.  As such, the purchaser instituted legal proceedings 
requesting a declaration to invalidate the securities charging the property that had been 
consented by the directors of Pomeroy Developments (Castleford) to guarantee Pomeroy 
Developments obligations.   
Although the court, presided by Justice Pennycuick, acknowledged that the directors of 
Pomeroy Developments (Castleford) had not considered the interests of the former 
company separately from the interests of the corporate group, the court felt that by 
accepting the plaintiff’s contention that only the individual consideration for Pomeroy 
Developments (Castleford) was acceptable, would be too strict an approach in the context 
of a corporate group. As per Justice Pennycuick:   
“That is, I think an unduly stringent test and would really absurd 
results, i.e., unless the directors of a company addressed their minds 
specifically to the interests of the company in connection with each 
particular transaction, that transaction would be ultra vires and void, 
notwithstanding that the transaction might be beneficial to the 
company.”390  
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The court did nuance its position by indicating that looking to the benefit of the group as 
a whole was not in and of itself sufficient.  Accordingly, the court held that each 
company was nonetheless a separate legal entity and therefore the directors of a particular 
company were never entitled to sacrifice the interests of that company in favour of the 
group.  Justice Pennycuick therefore reformulated as follows what he believed should be 
the proper test for directors in a corporate group: 
“whether an intelligent and honest man in the position of a director of 
the company concerned, could, in the whole of the existing 
circumstances, have reasonably believed that the transactions were 
for the benefit of the company.”391     
The court went on to conclude that under the aforementioned test, the directors of 
Castleford had not breached their duties to the individual company that they had been 
appointed to govern.   
Justice Pennycuick’s test, as formulated in the Charterbridge decision, has been labelled 
as an objective standard, in that directors may act in the interests of the group so long as 
an honest and reasonable director may infer that such conduct is also in the benefit of the 
company they have been appointed to govern.392 The standard formulated in 
Charterbridge takes into account the fact that in the context of group companies, the 
interests of the group as a whole will often override the interests of the individual entities 
within the group.393  However, as long as the interests of the group as a whole do not 
contradict the interests of the company within the group, there is no breach. As such, the 
Charterbridge decision appears to have attributed directors within corporate groups with 
greater latitude in decision-making; corporate decisions will not be subject to review 
where directors can objectively establish reasonable grounds for their decisions.394   
In England, Australia and New Zealand, courts have applied the Charterbridge standard 
to numerous situations involving an alleged breach of directors’ duties, many of which 
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tend to be nominee directors within corporate group.395 The objective standard as 
formulated in Charterbridge has even been compared with the pragmatic approach 
undertaken in the Broadcasting Station decision.396 According to author Lee, the 
preferred approach, should be the Charterbridge standard given that it is the approach 
that recognizes “the broadly convergent interests of the members within a group and the 
reality that directors would invariable be motivated by the concern to optimize such 
interests.”397 
In the Supreme Court of Victoria’s decision in Farrow Financing v. Farrow 
Properties,398 the facts leading up to the litigious dispute involved the corporate collapse 
of the “Farrow group”, a group of about 30 corporate entities.  At trial, the evidence filed 
before the court demonstrated a series of questionable transactions and misconduct 
between the different corporate entities prior to the collapse.  However, there was one 
particular inter-company loan that was at the heart of the dispute between the parties.  
The court acknowledged that although each company was a separate legal entity with its 
own governing board of directors, the companies were nonetheless run as a single unit.  
As such, the court did not reprimand such conduct generally, but rather accepted it as 
reflective of commercial reality.  The court approved and applied Charterbridge’s 
objective standard, adding however, as an additional criterion, in the case of an inter-
company loan, an examination of the likelihood of the burrowing entity’s ability to repay 
their debt.  Accordingly, based on an application of the objective standard as formulated 
in Charterbridge, namely that of the intelligent, honest and reasonably director, the court 
held that the directors in question were in breach of their fiduciary duties as it was clear 
that the inter-company loan derived no benefit to the lending company.399 
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Despite its general approval by doctrinal commentators as the more “realistic” approach 
to directors’ duties within corporate groups,400 certain courts have been hesitant to 
embrace the Charterbridge objective standard.  By way of example, in the unreported 
British decision of Ocular Sciences Ltd. and Another v. Aspect Vision Care Ltd. and 
Others, in examining whether the director of a wholly-owned subsidiary could abide by 
the parent company’s wishes, the court held that corporate duties of company directors 
must always remain consistent regardless of whether the director is appointed to a 
subsidiary company or a company within a corporate group.401  Although the court 
acknowledged the importance of the relationship between companies within a group, the 
court noted that at the end of the day, directors owe duties to the company they have been 
appointed to govern and not to the group as a whole.  Furthermore, the court held that in 
circumstances where the parent company is not satisfied, then it had many choices, such 
as passing a resolution obliging the directors to act in a particular way or even removing 
the nominee directors from office.  However, the court did not seem to give consideration 
to the practical implications of the parent’s conduct, namely that the risk of being 
removed from office may be enough to ensure that directors shall act in accordance with 
the instructions of the parent.   
Interestingly, despite an endorsement of the entity approach as formulated in Walker v. 
Wimborne, numerous courts have applied the Charterbridge objective standard at the 
request of the parties.402 In fact, Charterbridge was applied at both the trial and appeal 
levels in the case of Equiticorp v. Bank of New Zealand.403 However, despite the parties’ 
request that the Charterbridge objective standard be applied, the majority judges in 
appeal expressed important reservations about the Charterbridge standard.   
The facts of the Equiticorp decision are relatively complex; the Equiticorp group of 
companies expanded into a network of over 140 affiliated companies, initially starting in 
New Zealand and eventually diffusing all the way into Hong Kong and England through 
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the incorporation of a series of subsidiary and related companies.  The corporate group 
comprised two main divisions: the industrial and trading division and the finance 
division.  Mr. Allan Hawkins was the chairman of the holding company at the summit of 
the corporate group, Equiticorp Holdings Limited, controlling almost 41% of the holding 
company’s shares.  He also acted as a director and shareholder in various other 
companies within the group.  
The particular facts giving rise to the litigation between the parties involved an offer from 
the Bank of New Zealand to Equiticorp Tasman Ltd., a member of the industrial and 
trading division of the corporate group, of a loan of $200 million to finance a takeover 
bid.  However, it was decided that the actual transaction with the BNZ for the loan would 
take place with a wholly-owned subsidiary of Equiticorp Tasman, while Equiticorp 
Tasman would guarantee the loan. Thus, Uruz Pty Ltd., a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
Equiticorp Tasman, was chosen as the vehicle for the transaction with the BNZ.  The loan 
agreement was executed in July of 1987, with repayment due within a year. 
Subsequently, a series of uncontrollable events impacting the corporate group resulted in 
the inability of either Uruz or Equiticorp Tasman to repay the loan within the agreed-
upon term. Simultaneously, two other companies within the financial division of the 
corporate group, Equiticorp Financial Services Ltd. and Equiticorp Finance Ltd. became 
beneficiaries of a $50 million “liquidity reserve” with the BNZ.  As a result of pressure 
from the BNZ for repayment of the loan made to Uruz, the $50 million liquidity reserve 
belonging to Equiticorp Financial and Equiticorp Finance were ultimately utilized, on the 
orders of Mr. Hawkins, to repay the loan.  Subsequently, both Equiticorp Financial and 
Equiticorp Finance went into liquidation and their liquidators instituted legal proceedings 
challenging the use of the liquidity reserve to repay the loan made to Uruz.  Particularly, 
the liquidators contended that there was no authority for the use of the liquidity reserve, 
and that the directors’ of Equiticorp Financial and Equiticorp Finance were in breach of 
their fiduciary duties in following Mr. Hawkins’ orders.   
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At the trial level, the trial judge had recognized that it was Mr. Hawkins who had the 
authority despite the fact that he did not necessarily serve as a director on the boards of 
either Equiticorp Financial or Equiticorp Finance.404  Even the directors who disagreed 
with Mr. Hawkins ultimately acquiesced to the latter’s orders.  In terms of whether the 
directors of Equiticorp Financial and Equiticorp Finance had breached their fiduciary 
duties, the trial judge had applied the Charterbridge objective standard and concluded 
that there was no breach of fiduciary duty, particularly in view of the derivative benefit to 
the companies who provided the liquidity, given that they were indirectly providing 
assistance to their parent company.405 Furthermore, the trial judge had given a lot of 
weight to the fact that Mr. Hawkins wanted to ensure the bank’s continued support for the 
corporate group.406 If the corporate group were to lose the support of the BNZ, then the 
collapse of the corporate group would have naturally resulted in the collapse of both 
Equiticorp Financial and Equiticorp Finance.   
Although the decision was appealed, the majority judges of the Supreme Court of New 
South Wales confirmed the trial decision.  Although, the appeal court applied the 
Charterbridge objective standard, given that it had been applied by the trial judge and 
that it was requested by both parties at the appeal level, the majority nonetheless 
indicated a reluctance to apply Charterbridge particularly in relation to directors’ duties 
to exercise their powers in the interests of the company.407 Thus, although the majority 
judges applied Charterbridge, they nonetheless proposed an alternative test: 
“A preferable view may be that where the directors have failed to 
consider the interests of the relevant company they should be found to 
have committed a breach of duty. If, however, the transaction was, 
objectively viewed, in the interests of the company, then no 
consequences would flow from the breach. Such an inquiry would not 
require the court to consider how the hypothetical honest and 
intelligent director would have acted. On the contrary it would accept 
that a finding of breach of duty flows from a failure to consider the 
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interests of the company and would then direct attention at the 
consequences of the breach.”408    
The Equiticorp decision also encompassed a dissenting opinion that strongly opposed the 
majority judges’ application of the Charterbridge standard and held that the entity 
approach as formulated in Walker should have been followed.  Accordingly, it was 
submitted that the directors should have considered the “separate vulnerabilities” of 
Equiticorp Financial and Equiticorp Finance, particularly in situations of insolvency.409  
More recently, in Bell v. Westpac410, the Supreme Court of Australia reiterated the 
reservations expressed in Equiticorp as regards the Charterbridge standard, indicating 
that directors were bound to exercise their powers bona fide in what they consider as the 
interests of the company and not for any collateral purpose.411  
Subsequent to Equiticorp, another Australian decision, Gamble v. Hoffman, emerged 
which also dealt with directors’ duties in the context of interrelated companies.412 The 
facts of this decision are relatively simple; Mr. and Mrs. Hoffman were the sole directors 
and shareholders of a wholesale food company, Tallimba Pty Ltd.  They were also 
director and secretary of Sunhaven Nominees Pty Ltd., a food retailer created as a retail 
chain for Tallimba.  The disputed issues resulted from the authorization of the directors 
of Tallimba, to make numerous payments in connection with Sunhaven, including an 
agreement to lend Sunhaven $80,000 so as to surrender its lease.  However, Sunhaven 
became insolvent and Tallimba was unable to recover the loan it had made to Sunhaven, 
therefore resulting in Tallimba’s liquidation.  The joint liquidators of Tallimba instituted 
legal proceedings against Mr. and Mrs. Hoffman, alleging negligence, default and breach 
of their fiduciary duties towards Tallimba.  
With respect to the applicable test to assess whether the directors’ had breached their 
duties, the court did not apply either Walker v. Wimborne or Charterbridge. Rather, the 
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court applied a two-fold objective standard inspired by an earlier Australian case413 
involving the standard of due diligence expected of directors:  
“1. Assess what benefit, if any, Tallimba would derive from making 
these payments on behalf of Sunhaven. 
2. If there were any benefit so to be derived by Tallimba, to assess 
whether there was any reasonably foreseeable prospect of detriment to 
Tallimba.”414  
With respect to the aforementioned standard, the directors contended that the loans to 
Sunhaven ultimately derived a benefit for Tallimba in view of the fact that the two 
companies had an agreement pursuant to which Sunhaven would purchase all of its 
supplies from Tallimba.  In other words, the loan to Sunhaven would assist Tallimba in 
securing its wholesaling supplies contract with Sunhaven.  Furthermore, the directors 
asserted that the two companies essentially operated in harmony, with Sunhaven 
providing a retail arm to Tallimba.  Moreover, the directors relied on a particular 
statement made by Mason J. in Walker v. Wimborne, where he stated that “the payment of 
money by company A to company B to enable company B to carry on its business may 
have derivative benefits for company A as a shareholder in company B if that company is 
enabled to trade profitably or realize its assets to advantage.”415 
However, the judge rejected the directors’ submission that the advances to Sunhaven 
presented a prospect of accruing benefits to Tallimba, particularly in light of Sunhaven’s 
cession of all business operations.  Furthermore, evidence did not demonstrate that 
Tallimba was to receive any interest in exchange for the loan.  The judge also rejected the 
directors’ reliance on the aforementioned passage in Walker v. Wimborne, particularly in 
view of the fact that Tallimba did not hold any shares in Sunhaven and that such 
payments did not allow Sunhaven to “trade profitably” or “realize its assets to 
advantage.”416  
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The judge also distinguished the Equiticorp decision on the basis that Mr. Hoffman did 
not have any documented strategy for Sunhaven to become a profitable entity and that the 
financial reality of Sunhaven was “hopelessly insolvent”.417 The court noted that the 
survival of what the directors termed as their “corporate group” did not depend upon the 
$80,000 loan made to Sunhaven; such loan served no purpose for Sunhaven, was 
detrimental to Tallimba and ultimately only benefited the directors as guarantors of 
Sunhaven’s lease.418 In fact, the loan from Tallimba to Sunhaven was to shield the 
directors from their potential liability as guarantors of Sunhaven’s lease.  It is important 
to note that the credibility and motives of Mr. Hoffman, played a significant role in the 
court’s decision.  Furthermore, the weight attributable to this decision must be 
determined with caution given that the court held that the directors had conducted 
themselves in bad faith with a view to their own interests only.  
In Canada, the Charterbridge decision has been cited and endorsed by the Québec 
Superior Court in the Peoples v. Wise trial decision,419 however the objective standard as 
formulated in Charterbridge was not applied; rather, the Charterbridge decision appears 
to have been cited as authority that directors’ may never lose sight of the interests of the 
company on who’s board they have been nominated in favour of the interests of the 
parent or group.  In fact, the decision appeared to endorse a view that was more in line 
with the entity approach as formulated in the Walker v. Wimborne decision.420  In another 
Canadian decision, Westfair Foods v. Watt, the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench also 
indicated that directors of a subsidiary corporation must ensure that they do not lose sight 
of the interests of the subsidiary in favour of another corporation.421  
More recently, in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice’s decision of Ford Canada v. 
Ontario,422 the minority shareholders of Ford Motor Company of Canada, alleged that the 
intercompany agreements setting price transfer and allocation costs between Ford 
Canada, the subsidiary, and Ford U.S., the parent company, were oppressive to the 
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minority shareholders; namely in view of the fact that Ford Canada bore the currency 
exchange risks and the overall operation of the transfer-pricing system.423 In determining 
whether there was oppression, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice noted that Ford 
Canada was an independent entity with its own board of directors that was charged with 
acting in the best interests of Ford Canada and all of its shareholders.424 The court then 
went on to indicate: 
“One need not be naïve as to the probable nature of the vertical 
relationship of a U.S. parent and Canadian subsidiary where the 
widely-held minority interest is only some 6% of the total shares in the 
subsidiary. However, a majority shareholder cannot treat a subsidiary 
corporation with minority shareholders as its wholly-owned 
subsidiary. The majority shareholder cannot direct corporate 
decisions which enure to its benefit to the detriment of minority 
shareholders. [...]”425 
The Ontario Superior Court of Justice ultimately concluded that the intercompany 
agreements, particularly as regards the transfer-pricing system were unfair and that Ford 
Canada’s board of directors simply turned a blind eye and accepted the actions of its 
parent company in determining the elements and structure of the transfer-pricing system 
and the intercompany agreements.426 Although the Ontario Court of Appeal overturned 
the trial decision on several grounds, it agreed with the trial judge’s decision as regards 
the unfairness of the transfer-pricing system.  The Ontario Court of Appeal also 
emphasized that Ford Canada had simply accepted the system put into place by its parent; 
there was no evidence that the directors of Ford Canada had even attempted to negotiate a 
more favourable agreement.427 While the foregoing decision indicates preference for an 
entity-inspired approach rather than an enterprise approach towards directors’ duties in 
the context of corporate groups, one wonders again to what extent the facts of the case, 
and namely the passive conduct of the subsidiary directors, influenced the court’s 
decision.     
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Conversely, in the recent BCE 1976 decision, the Supreme Court of Canada indicated 
that it would be unwarranted for the purposes of its analysis to distinguish between the 
conduct of the directors of the holding company, BCE and the directors of its subsidiary, 
BELL Canada, nor would it factor into its analysis the “distinct corporate character of 
the two entities”.428 Although the Supreme Court’s reluctance to deal with this issue may 
have been a result of the lower courts’ decision not to have made the distinction,429 it may 
nonetheless evidence the court’s preference of the enterprise approach in the context of a 
corporate group in which the directors of both the parent and the subsidiary were the 
same individuals.    
In light of the foregoing, there appears to be authority in various jurisdictions in favour of 
both the entity and enterprise approaches.430 As such, there remains a certain ambiguity 
with respect to how nominee directors of companies within corporate groups, particularly 
the directors of subsidiary companies, should conduct themselves. In furtherance to this 
uncertainty, another decision involving directors’ duties in the context of corporate 
groups, Maronis Holdings Ltd. v. Nippon Credit Australia Pty. Ltd431 proposed another 
approach in response to this situation. 
4.2.3  A proper purpose test? 
The Maronis decision also revolved around whether directors’ had breached their 
fiduciary duties by failing to consider the interests of the company within the group for 
which they were appointed to govern.  Justice Bryson of the New South Wales Supreme 
Court indicated that the Charterbridge objective standard was first applied so as to 
determine whether a transaction should be null and void and not in the context of whether 
the directors’ had breached their fiduciary duties.  Moreover, he noted that most cases 
applied the Charterbridge standard on application of the parties and that even the 
majority judges’ in the Equiticorp decision were not in favour of Charterbridge and had 
put forth an alternative test.  Accordingly, Bryson J. held that the reformulated test by the 
majority in Equiticorp represented the “correct view”, under which the directors should 
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not be held liable for a breach if the transaction was “objectively viewed, in the interests 
of the company.”432 Accordingly, the judge concluded that if:  
“directors take a company into a transaction in the interests of a 
group of which it was part, or a parent company, or of a 
subsidiary company and what they did was, objectively viewed, in 
the interests of the company, they incurred no liability.”433  
Furthermore, the court noted that directors are not precluded from governing with a view 
to the interests of the group, provided that the company benefits in some derivative 
manner.434 As such, if it can be demonstrated that the directors had conducted themselves 
in a reasonable manner and had honestly believed that their actions would benefit both 
the individual company and the group, their actions would unlikely be in breach of their 
fiduciary duties.435 According to the court in the Maronis decision, in circumstances 
where directors’ of individual companies within a corporate group make decisions based 
on the interests of the group, without regard to the separate interests of the company, they 
act for an improper purpose and are consequently in breach.436 However, in author Lee’s 
opinion, applying the proper purpose rule in this context is inappropriate, given that it 
does not contribute to resolving the predicament faced by nominee directors in the 
context of corporate groups; rather, Lee prefers the Charterbridge standard given its 
recognition of commercial reality, that directors within corporate groups govern to 
optimize the interests of the group as a whole.437    
In light of the different approaches and standards that have been used by the judiciary to 
determine the scope of directors’ duties within corporate groups, it is difficult to ascertain 
how nominee directors in the context of corporate groups need to conduct themselves so 
as to avoid breaching their duties.  Unfortunately, foreign authority and doctrinal 
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commentary appears divided on this issue and little authority or commentary emanates 
from Canada.438  
Alternatively, the issue of directors’ duties in the context of parent-subsidiary 
relationships has been contemplated by various American commentators.439 Essentially, 
American commentators appear to have linked this issue back to the long standing debate 
as to whom directors’ owe their fiduciary duties, namely whether their duties are owed to 
the shareholder, being the parent company or to the corporation itself, being the 
subsidiary.440 In fact, it has been put forth that even if it is determined the directors must 
act in the interests of the corporation, it is unrealistic to require that directors of a 
subsidiary act solely in the interests of the subsidiary. As noted by Gauvin, “instead of 
requiring these directors to behave as if the subsidiary were an independent entity, the 
law should be more realistic and allow them to do the bidding of the parent or 
shareholder.”441 However, notwithstanding Gauvin’s assertion, it appears that the law 
continues to favour and apply traditional legal principal, even in the context of group 
companies.442 
To reiterate the premise that resurfaces throughout this analysis, the only guiding 
principle that can be restated with certainty is that directors must always act in the bona 
fide interests of the particular company that they have been appointed to govern, given 
that the law continues to treat companies within corporate groups as separate legal 
entities.443  Nonetheless, in circumstances where directors, acting reasonably, believe that 
their decisions or conduct benefit the group as a whole, despite a potential breach of their 
fiduciary duties in the strictest sense, they will unlikely face liability if they can evidence 
a derivative benefit to the particular company they have been appointed to govern.444 
                                               
438
 However, perhaps in an effort to ensure the equitable nature of related party transactions, securities regulators have 
adopted regulations (such as Regulation 61-101 – respecting protection of minority security holders in special 
transactions, c. V-1.1, r.0.1.02.1, relating to insider-bids, self-tender transactions and related party transactions) calling 
for enhanced disclosure obligations, more adequate minority shareholder protection and valuation requirements.  
439
 See e.g. Gouvin, supra note 365; Enriquez, supra note 353; Stefan J. Padfield, “In search of a higher standard: 
rethinking fiduciary duties of directors of wholly-owned subsidiaries” (2004-2005) 10 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 79 
[Padfield] (HEIN).  
440
 Gouvin, supra note 365 at 297. 
441
 Ibid. at 304-305. 
442
 Padfield, supra note 439 at 112. 
443
 Haddy, supra note 84. 
444
 Harding, supra note 394 at 608. 
 95 
However, if there is no derivative benefit to the company or in circumstances where the 
directors intentionally acted to the detriment of the company, even if their conduct is in 
the overall interest of the group, such directors are in breach of their duties and 
potentially subject to liability.445  
4.2.4 Statutory exceptions  
Despite the prevalence of the entity approach, legislation in both Australia and New 
Zealand contain various provisions that favour the enterprise approach.446 In fact, 
statutory exceptions contained in both Australia and New Zealand’s company law 
legislation, permit the directors of wholly-owned subsidiaries to govern in the interests of 
their parent company.  Furthermore, in New Zealand, the directors of partly-owned 
subsidiaries and joint venture companies may also govern in the interests of their parent 
or shareholders.  By way of example, Section 187 of the Corporations Act447 protects a 
director of a wholly-owned subsidiary that acts in the interests of the parent corporation 
against liability.  Essentially, the provision states that a director of a wholly-owned 
subsidiary is taken to have acted in good faith and in the best interests of the subsidiary 
when the following three conditions are cumulatively satisfied: (1) the constitution of the 
subsidiary expressly authorizes the director to act in the best interests of the holding 
company; (2) the director acts in good faith in the best interest of the holding company; 
and (3) the subsidiary is not insolvent at the time the director acts and does not become 
insolvent because of the director’s act.448  
The latter provision was adopted subsequent to legislative reforms that originated from 
the Australian Corporate Law Economic Reform Program.  Moreover, Section 187 was 
originally inspired from subsection 131(2) of the N.Z. Act449 which encompasses a 
similar provision.  However, the New Zealand provision takes the issue a step further and 
explicitly states that the director is to act in “a manner which he or she believes is in the 
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best interests of that company’s holding company”. As such, it appears that a subjective 
standard would be applicable in circumstances where Section 131 applies.450  
While Section 187 of the Corporations Act451 applies exclusively to wholly-owned 
subsidiary, subsections 131(3) and 131(4) of the N.Z. Act indicate that this principle is 
also applicable to the partly-owned subsidiary as well as to joint venture companies:  
131(3) A director of a company that is a subsidiary (but not a wholly-owned 
subsidiary) may, when exercising powers or performing duties as a director, 
if expressly permitted to do so by the constitution of the company and with the 
prior agreement of the shareholders (other than its holding company), act in 
a manner which he or she believes is in the best interests of that company’s 
holding company even though it may not be in the best interests of the 
company. 
 
131(4) A director of a company that is carrying out a joint venture between 
the shareholders may, when exercising powers or performing duties as a 
director in connection with the carrying out of the joint venture, if expressly 
permitted to do so by the constitution of the company, act in a manner which 
he or she believes is in the best interests of a shareholder or shareholders, 
even though it may not be in the best interests of the company. 
 
No similar provision appears to exist in either the CBCA, nor in other Canadian 
provincial company legislation. The issue of legislative reform and associated initiatives 
as regards nominee directors in Canada will be elaborated upon in the concluding 
chapter.  
4.3 Appointer liability 
Another practical difficulty that arises in connection with the appointment of nominee 
directors is the possibility of attributing liability to an appointer for breach of the nominee 
directors’ duties.  Although the act of designating a director does not alone create a legal 
relationship between nominee and appointer, in certain circumstances other legal 
relationships such as that of employer-employee or principal-agent may provide grounds 
that justify the liability of an appointer.452 In fact, there has been significant legal debate, 
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particularly in Australia, as to whether an appointer such as the controlling shareholder, 
major investor or joint venture partner can be held liable for a nominee’s wrongful 
conduct.453 This situation is equally preoccupying in parent-subsidiary relationships, and 
namely in situations where the subsidiary becomes insolvent as a result of decisions 
undertaken by a nominee director.454  
It has been put forth that the commonwealth’s position with respect to shareholders, is 
that they do not owe a duty to the corporation to supervise and ensure that the directors 
they nominate properly exercise their duties, and as such, they cannot be held liable for 
breach of their nominee’s duties to the corporation.455 Hence, it is the directors who owe 
fiduciary duties to the company and as such the general principle is that an appointer 
cannot be held liable for the wrongful conduct of its nominees.456  
However, both case law and doctrine appear to have opened the door towards the 
possibility of imposing liability on an appointer for the breaches caused by its nominees, 
particularly in circumstances where an appointer intentionally instructs a nominee to act 
in violation of his duties.  By way of example, at the trial level, in the PWA decision, the 
trial judge noted that an appointer, who instructs its nominee directors to conduct the 
affairs of the company in a manner that is contrary to the nominee’s fiduciary duties, 
could be held liable for the wrongful conduct of its nominees.457 Ultimately though, the 
court did not impose any liability on the appointer.  However, it is questionable whether 
the court was merely referring to extreme cases where the appointer is necessarily 
manipulating his nominees in a puppet like manner.458 Certain commentators are of the 
view that appointer liability should not be reserved for only the blatant and extreme cases 
of manipulation.  Justice and doctrinal commentator Thomas submits that “liability 
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should arise where the nominee directors are expected to act in accordance with some 
understanding or arrangement which creates an obligation or expectation of loyalty on 
the appointer.”459   
Australian doctrinal commentators have categorized the different grounds under which an 
appointer may be held liable as follows:  (1) as a shadow director; (2) under the doctrine 
of vicarious liability; (3) under criminal liability; (4) under civil liability; or (5) as a 
constructive trustee.460 However, given the lack of doctrinal commentary and case law on 
most of the foregoing grounds, only two of them shall be explored in more detail herein, 
namely liability as a shadow director and liability under the doctrine of vicarious liability.  
4.3.1 Shadow directorship 
The U.K. Act defines “shadow directors” as persons “whose directions or instructions the 
directors of the company are accustomed to act.”461 The Corporations Act contains a 
similar provision, absent an express reference to the term “shadow director”. 462  
It is uncertain whether the notion of a shadow director has been recognized in Canada; 
the CBCA defines a director as either a person formally appointed to the board of 
directors, or a person “occupying the position of director by whatever name called.”463 
However, this appears to be a reference to “de facto” directorship. A “de facto” director 
has been defined as a person who, without being formally appointed to the board, 
undertakes the same duties that are generally undertaken as a director.464 The British 
decision of Re Hydrodam (Corby) Ltd.465 draws a distinction between the two concepts, 
where it was held that a de facto director was one who claimed to act and conduct himself 
as though validly appointed as a director while a shadow director by contrast:  
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“does not claim or purport to act as a director.  On the contrary, 
he claims not to be a director.  He lurks in the shadows, 
sheltering behind others who, he claims, are the only directors of 
the company to the exclusion of himself.  He is not held out as a 
director by the company.”466   
It has also been contended that a shadow director need not necessarily conceal his 
participation in the company.467 
One of the objectives of legislating or recognizing the concept of shadow or de facto 
directorship is undoubtedly to “catch” individuals who act as directors through the 
directors that they have appointed to the board on paper.468 It has been put forth that 
appointers may be categorized as shadow directors if, based on the factual situation, the 
director is accustomed to always acting pursuant to his appointer’s instructions.469 The 
raison d’être behind imposition of liability as a shadow directly likely stems from the 
view that if the appointer is actively participating in the company’s governance then, in 
circumstances of misconduct, the appointer should also be exposed to liability.470 In one 
Canadian decision, the court appears to have endorsed liability equivalent to shadow 
directorship.471  In Mogil v. Abelson, the nominating shareholders were held liable to the 
corporation for the breach by their nominee director in light of evidence that the nominee 
had acted as an agent for the sole benefit of his appointers.472  
It is important to note however that the imposition of liability as a “shadow director” 
appears to require positive evidence of interference.  The appointment of a nominee 
director who naturally favours his appointer’s interest is not itself sufficient to infer the 
appointer’s liability.  Accordingly, it is unlikely that an appointer shall be attributed 
liability as a shadow director merely because he provides instructions to his nominee,473 
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or because his nominee reports back confidential corporate information.474 As such, in 
order to incur liability as a shadow director, the appointer is required to actively give 
instructions to his nominee, the latter who is expected to act, upon all these instructions.  
Furthermore, it has also been put forth that the person or entity needs to influence the 
majority of directors on the board so as to be characterized as a shadow.475  Thus, in order 
to qualify as a shadow director, the latter is necessarily required to control a majority of 
the board.  Consequently, the appointer of one or two directors on a board comprised of 
five or six directors shall unlikely be categorized as a shadow director.476 The element of 
repetition must be present and the nominee directors must be accustomed to acting 
pursuant to their appointer’s wishes.  
In the decision of Australian Securities Commission v. AS Nominees Limited, Justice Finn 
of the Australian Federal Court appears to indicate that shadow directorship requires 
directors “to act at all times and for all purposes […] entirely as [their appointer’s] 
puppets without exercising any discretion at all in company matters.”477   Thus, it appears 
that the director must act as a veritable “puppet director” so as to incur the liability of his 
appointer.478 In Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v. Deverell, the British Court of 
Appeal had to determine whether two individuals could be qualified as shadow 
directors.479 The court turned to evidence “other than ownership or control of the 
company” to ultimately conclude that the two defendants were in fact shadow directors, 
in view of the evidence to the effect that they were, “personally involved” and “played a 
prominent role” in important transactions; and that one of the defendants “bossed 
everyone around from the directors downwards”.480 In determining that an individual was 
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a shadow director, the court looked to identify who veritably influenced the corporate 
affairs of the company.481  
It has also been contended that other parties at risk of being unintentionally labelled 
shadow directors include parent or holding companies.482 As previously noted, parent and 
holding companies often nominate the directors onto the boards of their subsidiaries and 
as such these companies may be at risk for liability as shadow directors.  However, the 
courts still remain hesitant to impose liability, as a shadow director, on parent or holding 
companies for the wrongful conduct of nominee directors on the board of their 
subsidiaries,483 likely for the same reasons that courts hesitate to pierce the corporate veil.   
However, in situations where management and finances are effectively controlled 
through nominees, the controlling entity may be considered a shadow director and be 
held in breach, as was the case in Standard Chartered bank of Australia Ltd. v. Antico.484  
In this decision, the parent company, Pioneer International Ltd. held a 42% share interest 
in one of its subsidiaries, Giant Resources Ltd.  Pioneer had appointed three nominee 
directors on to the board of Giant, which subsequently entered into an agreement with the 
Standard Chartered Bank of Australia Ltd. for a facility of $30,000,000.  The facility was 
subsequently renegotiated and extended on several occasions, with the bank eventually 
providing Giant with extended financial support via an overdraft facility.  However, 
Giant was nonetheless forced into liquidation.  
The bank subsequently instituted proceedings against Pioneer and its three nominee 
directors on Giant’s board and essentially alleged that they should be held liable.  On the 
question of whether Pioneer could be held liable, the Supreme Court of New South 
Wales, presided by Justice Hodgson, noted that the mere fact that Pioneer had three 
nominees on the board of Giant along with the fact that it held a 42% share interest was 
not enough to conclude that Pioneer was either a de facto or shadow director.485 
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However, Pioneer was the only shareholder with a significant share interest; and evidence 
demonstrated that Pioneer exercised considerable financial control over Giant including 
the imposition of severe financial reporting requirements.  It was also evidenced that 
Pioneer exercised management control over Giant with respect to important corporate 
decisions.  For the foregoing reasons, the court ultimately held that Pioneer was liable as 
a director to Giant.  Although, it has been argued that this case may be distinguished from 
other cases given that Pioneer was the only major shareholder of Giant.486 
In light of the foregoing, despite the possibility of appointer liability in the form of 
shadow directorship, it appears that the “threshold” for the imposition of such liability 
remains quite high.487 
4.3.2 Vicarious liability of the appointer  
Imposing vicarious liability on a nominee’s appointer stems from the common law 
principle that an employer is generally liable for an employee’s faults in circumstances 
where such faults occur within the course of employment.488 Liability of the principal for 
the fault of his agents and servants is an equivalent concept under Québec civil law and 
has been codified by way of Article 1463 of the C.C.Q. The concept of vicarious liability 
of the appointer is essentially derived from the appointer’s control over the nominee, as is 
characteristic of an employment relationship.489 As regards appointer-nominee 
relationships, such control is rooted in the appointer’s ability to appoint and terminate the 
nominee.490  
As once noted by the New Zealand Federal Court, the ground for imposing such liability 
on appointers arises from the fact that nominee directors are “responding, perhaps 
unconsciously, to the commercial imperative summed up in the maxim: “He who pays the 
piper calls the tune.”491 Despite commentary that seems to support the latter proposition, 
the two decisive cases on vicarious liability of appointers, both emanating from New 
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Zealand, did not impose vicarious liability on the appointers in question.  However in the 
second case, Dairy Containers Ltd. v. NZI Bank492, the trial judge elaborated in detail on 
the possibility of imposing vicarious liability.  
The New Zealand decision of Kuwait v. National 493 was the first case that appeared to 
explicitly deal with the possibility of imposing vicarious liability on the appointer of 
nominee directors. In this decision, National Mutual Life Nominees Ltd. acted as a 
trustee to AIC Securities Ltd., a money broker, as required under the Securities Act 1978. 
Kuwait Asia Bank EC owned 40% of the shares of AIC, and in virtue of an agreement 
with several other shareholders, had appointed two directors to the board of AIC 
Securities.  However, AIC Securities subsequently became insolvent and went into 
liquidation. National was sued by one of the depositors who brought a representative 
action against it, contending National’s breach of duties under the trust deed.  Although 
the action between National and the depositor was ultimately settled, National instituted 
proceedings against Kuwait Asia and various other defendants for contribution to the 
settlement amount.  National essentially contended that the nominee directors had 
committed a breach of their duty to care and as such, their appointer, Kuwait Asia, should 
be held responsible. More specifically, with respect to the issue of appointer liability, 
National contended that Kuwait Asia should be held vicariously liable as the employer of 
the two nominee directors and that the relationship between Kuwait Asia and the 
nominees was that of principal-agent. As such, Kuwait Asia should be held responsible 
for the acts and omissions of its agents.494   
The Privy Counsel rejected National’s submissions with respect to holding Kuwait Asia 
vicariously liable for the acts of its employees, being the nominee directors.  The majority 
ruled that in absence of any alleged fraud or bad faith495 on the part of Kuwait Asia, the 
latter could not be held liable for the shortcomings of its nominee directors.  The Privy 
Counsel further stated that for the purposes of the alleged breach, the nominees were 
directors and agents of AIC Securities and not those of Kuwait Asia.  Additionally, it was 
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also noted that despite the nominee directors’ relationship with their employer-appointer, 
Kuwait Asia, in their capacity as directors they were obligated to disregard the latter’s 
welfare: “[the nominee directors] were bound to ignore the interests and wishes of their 
employer, [Kuwait Asia]. They could not plead any instruction from the bank as an 
excuse for breach of their duties to [AIC] and [National]”496 
The aforementioned decision should be contrasted with another seminal decision 
rendered several years later, namely Dairy Containers v. NZI Bank497 in which the court 
criticized the Kuwait v. National decision for ruling against the imposition of vicarious 
liability.  The facts of the Dairy Containers v. NZI Bank decision are complex and shall 
be simplified for the purposes of the present.  
Dairy Containers Ltd., a wholly-owned subsidiary of the New Zealand Dairy Board, was 
essentially comprised of a board of NZDB-appointed directors.  These directors were also 
senior executive, and therefore employees of the NZDB.  Dairy Containers’ operations 
initially involved the fabrication of cans for the NZDB, but it later became an important 
investment company, holding several accounts in numerous banks.  In 1989, it was 
discovered that the three nominee directors on Dairy Containers’ board had 
misappropriated Dairy Containers’ funds.  The nominees were terminated and 
subsequently pleaded guilty to criminal charges including fraud.  Diary Containers 
instituted legal proceedings against the New Zealand Auditor-General, who had audited 
Dairy Containers during the relevant time frame, and several other banks, alleging that 
the audit was deficient and claiming over $11,000,000 dollars for damages suffered as a 
result of the misappropriation of the nominees.  However, the Auditor-General argued 
contributory negligence on the part of Dairy Containers and its directors as well as the 
liability of the NZDB in its capacity as the employer of the nominee directors and as a 
shadow director.   
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With respect to the contention of vicarious liability, Justice Thomas questioned the Privy 
Council’s decision in Kuwait v. National not to apply the doctrine of vicarious liability to 
circumstances where the breach of duties occurred in the course of the nominee directors’ 
employment.  As Justice Thomas indicated, a nominee director’s responsibilities to the 
company he has been appointed to govern does not necessarily prevail over other legal 
responsibilities.498  Thomas criticized the Kuwait v. National decision for contending that 
an employee who acts as a director ceases to act as an employee.  Furthermore, the 
learned judge emphasized that one must not overlook commercial reality in which an 
employee shall undoubtedly favour their employer, particularly in circumstances where 
they have been given a clear mandate to “to protect and promote their employer’s 
interests.”499  Moreover, the fact that they owe their appointment to their employer and 
the fact that their employer holds the power to dismiss them, serves to reinforce such 
loyalty.  Consequently, nominees govern with a view to the interests of their appointers 
and realistically, “reserve their primary or ultimate loyalty for their masters and not the 
company to which they have been appointed.”500 Thus, why shouldn’t an appointer be 
held liable for the unlawful conduct of his employee-directors, where such conduct was 
committed “on the job”? Justice Thomas’ underlying conclusion was that there was no 
valid justification for excluding the doctrine of vicarious liability in connection with 
employees who serve as nominee directors.501 However, ultimately the court did not 
impose vicarious liability given the fact that it felt bound by the Kuwait v. National 
decision.   
In the Dairy Containers decision, Justice Thomas went on to make important statements 
on the position of nominee directors.  Thomas noted that their position is inherently in 
conflict with the “no-conflict” rule as outlined in the aforementioned Aberdeen Railway 
case.502 The judge proceeded to review the authority with respect to nominee directors in 
both the U.K and England to ultimately conclude, true to the pragmatic view, and perhaps 
better stated than any before him: 
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“Nominee directors need not necessarily approach company problems 
with an open mind and they may pursue their appointer’s interests 
provided that, in the event of a conflict, they prefer the interests of the 
company. In such circumstances the breadth of the fiduciary duty has 
been narrowed by agreement amongst the body of shareholders. In 
other words, the corporators have agreed upon an adjusted form of 
fiduciary obligation.”503 
Following the Dairy Containers v. NZI Bank decision, Justice Thomas firmly reiterated 
his position in a case comment, in which he emphasized that nominee director remain 
agents or employees of their appointer and therefore, it is unrealistic to argue that because 
nominee directors owe their primary duty to the company, they cannot be considered 
agents or employees of their appointer.504  
The issue of vicarious liability has also been discussed, albeit briefly, in several 
subsequent Australian cases.  In one particular case, it was held that the trustees of 
investment trusts had standing to lawful sue an appointer for the wrongful conduct of its 
nominee directors.505  Subsequently, in the case of LMI Pty Ltd. v. Baulderstone Pty Ltd., 
the court held that the plaintiffs were correct in not having attempted to impose vicarious 
liability on the employer-appointer of employee-nominees; the court reiterated the 
principle enunciated in the Kuwait v. National case, that a director on the board of a 
company, regardless of his appointment, is independent when it comes to performing his 
functions as a director and as such, vicarious liability should not be attached to his 
appointer-employer for the employee’s conduct in his capacity as director.506  
There have been several principal arguments put forth to support the imposition of 
vicarious liability on appointers, such as the fact that it is in the interests of equity that the 
employer-appointer bears the burden for losses caused by its employee-nominees, as 
opposed to the company or its creditors.507 Another compelling argument is that the risk 
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of liability may deter appointer-employers from instructing or allowing their employee-
nominees to conduct themselves in an unlawful manner.508 
Conversely, disagreement with the imposition of vicarious liability emanates from deeply 
rooted company law principles and namely the separate identity doctrine.  As one author 
notes, “it is crucial that this basic premise does not give way merely because there is 
evidence that the affairs of the company are controlled by particular individuals or other 
companies.”509  Other arguments against the imposition of vicarious liability include the 
premise that it may hinder business practice such as dissuading the appointment of 
nominee directors who do serve a useful purpose, despite their conflict of interest.510  
In view of the foregoing, the law as it currently stands does not appear inclined to impose 
vicarious liability.  Perhaps a middle ground could be that the mere negligence of a 
nominee director would not be enough to impose vicarious liability on his appointer.511 
However, in deliberate cases, where the appointer instructs its nominees on how to 
govern, or has required them to act in violation of their fiduciary duties, vicarious liability 
could be imposed.512  
4.3.3 Liability of the nominee director towards his appointer? 
To this writer’s knowledge, the issue of the nominee director’s liability towards his 
appointer by virtue of his appointment as a director does not appear to have been the 
subject of any legal debate or scholarly research.  However, it has been contended that 
the imposition of liability of the nominee director towards his appointer by virtue of such 
appointment is not possible, given the fact that the nomination itself does not create any 
legal relationship between the two that would give rise to such liability.513 However, as 
indicated above, nominee directors may owe duties towards their appointers in the 
context of an employment relationship or by reason of an agreement between nominee 
                                               
508
 Ibid. at 86. 
509
 Grantham, supra note 356 at 145. 
510
 Pizer, supra note 453 at 86. 
511
 Robyn Carroll, “Shadow Director and Other Third Party Liability for Corporate Activity” in Ian Ramsay, ed., 
Corporate Governance and the Duties of Company Directors, Centre for Corporate Law and Securities Regulation 
(Melbourne : Faculty of Law of the University of Melbourne, 1997) at 169. 
512
 Ibid. 
513
 Austin et al., Company Directors, supra note 34 at para. 14.35.  
 108 
and appointer.514 Accordingly however, such duties cannot override the nominee 
director’s duty to the corporation on whose board he has been nominated.515 
4.4 Chapter summary 
The objective of this fourth chapter was to highlight some of the most prominent 
difficulties caused by the nominee director’s inherent position of conflict.  As illustrated 
in the preceding pages, numerous doctrinal commentary and case law, most of which 
emanate from foreign jurisdictions, have attempted to provide solutions to the difficulties 
underlined herein.  
As regards the access and disclosure to corporate information, the nominee director’s 
access to corporate information is neither regulated nor limited, unless misuse is 
evidenced.  However, absent consent of the board, disclosure by the nominee director of 
confidential corporate information back to his appointer, shall likely result in a breach of 
the nominee director’s fiduciary duties.  However, the consequences of such breach will 
likely depend on the consequences of the disclosure.  By way of example, if an appointer 
acts on the information received from his nominee in a manner that is harmful to the 
corporation, the nominee’s liability will likely be incurred.  In such circumstances the 
nominee will have to avoid disclosure or alternatively, resign from the board.  The rules 
regarding the conduct of nominee directors in the context of corporate groups or parent-
subsidiary relationships are even murkier; in Australia and New Zealand, it appears that 
certain statutory exceptions allowing nominee directors of subsidiary companies to 
govern in the interests of the parent illustrate a legislative intent to reconcile the law with 
commercial reality.  However, in jurisdictions such as Canada, it appears that the entity 
approach continues to prevail and it is doubtful whether nominees of subsidiary 
companies, or of companies within a group, may govern primarily in the interests of the 
parent or the group as opposed to the particular member of the group on whose board 
they have been appointed.  Lastly, the risk of appointer liability illustrates that the 
practical difficulties faced by nominee directors also extend to their appointers. Albeit 
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rare, the potential for appointer liability is nonetheless a warning for persons with the 
objective of controlling or manipulating their directors.
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5. CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing analysis, it is not surprising that the issues surrounding nominee 
directors have alerted legislators as to whether legislative reform may provide a viable 
solution to the inherent conflict faced by these directors.516 As previously noted, certain 
legislative measures have been taken, particularly in New Zealand and Australia, where 
the pragmatic view and the enterprise approach appear to have inspired the adoption of 
various provisions in company law statutes.  In fact, out of all the jurisdictions researched 
for the purposes of the present thesis, it appears that New Zealand is home to the most 
detailed legislative framework dealing with nominee directors.  Interestingly, while 
legislators in Australia, Canada and the U.K. have in the past contemplated with the idea 
of regulating nominee directors, subject to certain exceptions, they ultimately opted 
against such reform.   
 
It is no surprise that the jurisdiction that has provided the most judicial authority and 
doctrinal commentary in connection with nominee directors has also undertaken the most 
comprehensive governmental discussions and associated research on the subject.  In fact, 
the Australian Companies and Securities Law Review Committee released two reports in 
the late 1980s that rigorously elaborated on both the theoretical and practical issues 
pertaining to nominees, including the possibility of legislative reform.517  
 
The first of these reports, namely Discussion Paper No.7, identified the different issues 
that required review, including: (1) whether nominee directors should be permitted an 
attenuated standard of the fiduciary duty required of all directors generally; (2) whether 
to allow nominee directors any exemptions; (3) whether a statutory definition of nominee 
directors should be adopted as well as a register so as to track these directors; (4) the 
nature of the commitments a nominee may make to his appointer; (5) the personal 
liability of the nominee; (6) appointers’ liability; (7) nominee directors and the 
oppression remedy; (8) nominee directors representing parent companies; and (9) 
                                               
516
 In Canada, see Canada Business Corporations Act, Discussion Paper, supra note 26.  
517
 Discussion paper No. 7, 1987, supra note 16; Report No. 8, 1989, supra note 236.  
 111 
reporting back to the appointer.518  A few years later, a follow-up report, namely Report 
No. 8, was published which reiterated the issues that were highlighted in the discussion 
paper and suggested several legislative amendments and other proposals in connection 
with nominee directors.519   
 
Essentially, as regards to whether nominee directors should be permitted an attenuated 
standard of the fiduciary duty, Report No. 8 noted that while legislative clarifications may 
fail to cover all possible commercial situations, it should not ignore the problems faced 
by nominee directors and as such, it was submitted that the Corporations Act520 should 
contain “more direct recognition” of nominee directors.521  However, Report No. 8 did 
not elaborate any further on this issue.  With respect to an exemption for nominee 
directors, a draft provision similar to the exemption contained in the Alberta Act522 was 
suggested; although the report ultimately recommended a provision that would indicate 
the conditions under which a nominee director may consider the interests of his appointer 
without breaching his fiduciary duties.  These conditions would include the prior 
informed consent of all members of the corporation, authorization under a shareholders’ 
agreement or, in circumstances where the company is a wholly-owned subsidiary and the 
director considers the interests of his appointer, authorization of the parent or holding 
company.  The aforementioned situation would evidently be limited to solvent 
corporations.  Report No. 8 did not recommend allowing the constituent documents to 
authorize a director to consider the interests of his appointer as such could lead to a 
“widespread dilution of the directors’ duty of loyalty where dilution was not 
warranted”.523 Moreover, Report No. 8 also opted against a statutory definition of 
nominee directors.524  However, the report did recommend the creation of a register to 
publicly identify nominee directors.  Report No. 8 also suggests that the provision already 
included in corporate statute requiring directors to disclose certain situations of conflict 
of interest, be extended to require directors to disclose whether they are nominees and the 
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particularities of their appointment, namely whether they are expected to act in the 
interests of their appointers.  With respect to the possibility of defining in advance the 
issues in connection with which a nominee director may make “commitments” to his 
appointer, it was noted that such a definition would be quite impossible to accomplish.  
However, it was put forth that a general formulation would be advisable under which 
several limitations are imposed such that a director would not be able to override certain 
duties such as those related to the company’s financial statements, or taking into account 
the interests of creditors where the company is on the brink of insolvency.  As regards the 
nominee director’s personal liability, Report No. 8 concluded that such a matter is best 
left to the judiciary.  Furthermore, the report did not make any recommendations with 
respect to appointer liability.  
 
Despite the foregoing, the recommendations set forth in Report No. 8 do not appear to 
have been adopted as of yet, save for Section 187 with respect to nominee directors of 
wholly-owned subsidiaries.525 Interestingly, almost a decade ago, the Companies and 
Securities Advisory Committee undertook yet another examination of the issues relating 
to nominee directors, this time in the context of corporate groups.526 The issues relating to 
nominee directors that were contemplated in the Final Report included regulation of the 
disclosure of the nominee’s position, the nominee’s fiduciary duties, the nominee’s 
access and disclosure of corporate information, his liability as well the liability of his 
appointers.  However, despite certain interesting suggestions noted by the Committee, the 
latter ultimately appeared not to make any recommendations with respect to enacting 
further legislation with a view to regulating the position of nominee directors and their 
appointers.527  
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In the U.K., the issues particular to nominee directors were also contemplated in a 1985 
paper published by the British House of Commons and presided by Chairman Sheldon 
Roberts.528 The paper included a summary of the main difficulties faced by nominee 
directors and although it provided for certain legislative recommendation; these 
recommendations do not appear to have been implemented.   
 
Over a decade later, the English and Scottish Law Commissions, the Department of Trade 
and Industry and particularly, the Company Law Review Steering Group (“CLRSG”) 
collectively embarked on an extensive research project, resulting in the release of a 
substantial number of reports with respect to directors’ duties, with the objective of 
instigating a wide-spread review of the U.K. company law.529 This included, for the first 
time, a legislative enactment of directors’ duties, which were, prior to the U.K. Act.530 
solely entrenched in the common law.  The issue of nominee directors appears to have 
been briefly discussed in one of the Scottish Law Commissions’ discussion papers.531 
where the different views expressed in England and Australia were compared.  
Ultimately no conclusions or recommendations appear to have been made.  Moreover, the 
CLRSG did not appear to undertake any discussion of nominee directors or even 
directors’ duties in the context of corporate groups.532  However, more recently, it 
appears that the British House of Commons indicated that the company law reform would 
not change the general law on nominee directors.533 The Standing Committee stated that 
once appointed:  “The nominee director must ignore the interests and wishes of the 
person who appointed him, and we rely there on case law, including [the Scottish Co-
operative and the Kuwait v. National decisions].”534  
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As noted in various instances throughout this analysis, there is limited doctrinal 
commentary and scholarly research that specifically treats the conflict of interest faced by 
nominee directors in Canada.  The subject was nonetheless considered by Industry 
Canada, in a 1995 discussion paper that examined the different issues pertaining to 
directors’ liability under the CBCA.535  
 
One particular issue that the discussion paper deliberated was whether to permit nominee 
directors to give special, albeit not exclusive, consideration to the interests of their 
appointers.  The discussion paper noted the difficulties faced by nominee directors and 
considered the trilogy of Canadian decisions rendered in relation to nominees, including 
the PWA and Deluce Holdings cases.  The discussion paper also reflected upon the 
provision enacted in the Alberta Act536 in which nominees are permitted to give 
consideration to the interests of their appointers.  Several options were put forth as 
regards nominee directors: (a) the adoption of a provision parallel to that contained in the 
Alberta Act537; or (b) the adoption of a provision parallel to that in the Alberta Act,538 
with an extra precaution, in the form of a phrase to the effect that nominee directors may 
give special, although not exclusive, consideration to the interests of their appointers: “so 
long as the consideration is not contrary to the best interests of the corporation.”539 
However, ultimately, the discussion paper’s recommendation was not to amend the law, 
principally because of a concern that legislative reform may risk diluting directors’ 
fiduciary duties owed to the corporation they have been appointed to govern.540 
Subsequent to the release of the aforementioned discussion paper, legislative reform in 
response to the conflicts faced by nominee directors does not appear to have been the 
subject of any further publically published reports by the Canadian government.  
 
In view of the fact that the foregoing jurisdictions opted out of providing legislative 
guidance in connection with nominee directorship, difficult questions and issues remain 
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unresolved. The crux of the issue, being the inherent conflict of interest faced by nominee 
directors is for the most part theoretical,541 however, faced with practical issues, 
Canadian courts do not appear to provide nominee directors with any attenuation of their 
fiduciary duties; and therefore, the interests of the company as a whole shall continue to 
prevail.  While Australian and New Zealand courts generally demonstrate greater 
tolerance towards a nominee director’s outside allegiance, it is questionable whether the 
decisions illustrative of the pragmatic view were a product of the factual circumstances in 
each case.  Do good facts make good law? By of example, in the Levin case, one cannot 
ignore that the sole objective behind the appointment of the nominee directors was to 
secure the interests of the mortgagee; a security that the plaintiff, being the sole 
shareholder, had explicitly agreed to.542 As such, under the particular circumstances, it 
would have been unfair for the court to have granted the plaintiff’s proceedings and 
annulled the nominee directors’ conduct.    
 
It has been submitted that similar to the Levin case, in light of the conflicting case law 
and in absence of any legislative initiatives, judges who are faced with assessing whether 
a nominee director has breached his fiduciary duties, should develop a reasoned and 
equitable formula in determining whose interests prevail.543 Such reasoning should 
involve a balance between the interests of the corporation and those of the appointer and 
should also depend on the particular facts of each case. 544 
 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, a nominee director can still represent his appointer’s 
interests while minimizing his risks of liability by undertaking several precautions. 
Firstly, transparency of the nominee director’s appointment is crucial.  As noted by 
Veasey and Guglielmo, “so long as the constituency directors’ representative capacity is 
transparently disclosed to stockholders and fellow directors, constituency directors could 
attempt to persuade the entire board that their sponsors’ interests represent or are 
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aligned with the interests of the corporation and all its stockholders.”545 Secondly, 
nominee directors should abstain from voting on any decisions that would create a 
conflict of interest.546 As regards the disclosure of corporate information, absent board 
consent, it is recommended that the nominee does not disclose confidential information to 
his appointer.547 As noted again by Veasey and Guglielmo, “while constituency directors 
can provide their sponsors with a voice in the board-room, they should not expect to be 
their sponsor’s eyes and ears in all circumstances.”548 Moreover, in the context of 
corporate groups, nominee directors who govern pursuant to the interests of the group as 
a whole may not disregard the interests of the particular entity on whose board they have 
been appointed to govern and must even be prepared to justify their conduct by 
evidencing derivative benefits to such entity. As the law stands today, the bottom line is 
that where the interests of an appointer and those of the company diverge, it is clear that 
the nominee director must necessarily favour the interests of the corporation.  
                                               
545
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546
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